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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON,
Respondent / Appellee,

Case No. 20070578-SC
20060575-CA

v.
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON,
Petitioner / Appellant

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
By

virtue

of

having

granted

the

Petition

for

Writ

of

Certiorari, this Court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) (2002) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2 (5) (2002) .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the court of appeals correctly affirmed the trial

court's

broad

increased

discretion

alimony

upon

in

the

issuing

an

termination

equitable

of

child

order

for

support.

On

certiorari, this Court does not review the decision of the trial
court but rather that of the court of appeals.
County,

2001 UT 10, UlO, 26 P. 3d 193 (citing State

S.W.,

2000 UT 79, ^ 8 , 12 P.3d 8 0 ) ; see also

Bank,

795 P.2d 1127, 1129

(Utah 1990)

Landes

Harper
ex rel.
v.

(citing Madsen

v.

M.W.

Capital
v.

Summit
and
City
Borthick,

769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)).
reviewed for correctness.
(citing Massey

P.3d

The court of appeals' decision is

See Orvis

v. Johnson,

v. Griffiths,

2008 UT 2, f6,

2007 UT 10, %S, 152 P.3d

312) .
Preservation

of Issue

Citation

or Statement

of Grounds

for

Review:

Petitioner preserved the alimony issue by way of motion presented
to the trial court (See,
2.

e.g.,

R. 64-65).

Whether Petitioner is precluded from raising the tax

results issue on certiorari due to the failure to preserve this
issue in both the trial court and the court of appeals.

This issue

is reviewed by this Court as a matter of law for correction of
error.

See 438 Main Street

P. 3d 801 (quoting Brookside

v. Easy Heat,
Mobile

UT 48, 1(14, 48 P.3d 968); see also
HUl8-19 f

Preservation

164

p

-3d

397

of Issue

Inc.,

Home Park,
State

v.

2004 UT 72, ^51, 99
Ltd.

v. Peebles,

Worwood,

2002

2007 UT 47,

-

Citation

or Statement

of Grounds

for

Review:

Petitioner essentially concedes on certiorari that he failed to
preserve this issue in both the trial court and the court of
appeals.

See Appellant's Brief, p. 1; see also

forth in the instant Brief of Respondent.

2

Argument II set

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
and regulations, the interpretation of which is determinative, are
set out verbatim with the appropriate citation in the body and
arguments of the instant Brief of Respondent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves an appeal from specific provisions in the
Decree of Divorce dealing with the trial court's equitable award of
alimony.

The parties separated in January 2003, after a lengthy

marriage that resulted in a total of six children, four of which
were minors at the time of trial.

Approximately seven months

later, Kynda Kay Richardson filed for divorce, to which Kenneth
Andrew Richardson responded.
The parties subsequently appeared before the district court
for a bench trial, after which the trial court took the case under
advisement.

Almost four months later, the trial court issued a

Memorandum Decision.
Mr. Richardson filed a Motion and Memorandum, requesting the
trial court to reconsider its ruling, to which Ms. Richardson
responded.

Almost

another Memorandum

five months later, the trial court
Decision, granting

denying it in part.

3

the Motion

issued

in part

and

Thereafter, the trial court issued its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce.
appealed.

Mr. Richardson

The court of appeals subsequently issued a Memorandum

Decision affirming the award of alimony.
Mr. Richardson filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which
this Court granted.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are drawn in a light most favorable to the trial
court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at trial.
Tucker

v.

Tucker,

Cf.

910 P.2d 1209, 1216 (Utah 1996).

1.

The parties separated in January 2003 (R. 304:6:4-5).

2.

Several months later, Ms. Richardson filed for Divorce,

seeking, among other things, child support and alimony consistent
with established legal principles (R. 1-8) .
3.

Kenneth Andrew Richardson responded (R. 12-17) .

4.

The parties appeared before the district court for a

bench trial on February 8, 2005 (R. 44).
5.

At the time of trial, the parties had been married for

approximately twenty-five years (R. 304:6:4-5).
6.

The parties had a total of six children over the course

of the marriage, the following four of which were minors at the
time of trial:

Dana May Richardson

4

(DOB:

May 17, 1987); Kyle

Allen Richardson (DOB: July 19, 1988); Avery Keen Richardson (DOB:
August 21, 1990); and Justin Wallace Richardson (DOB:

March 25,

1993) (R. 2; R. 304:7-8; R. 47).
7.

During trial, both parties provided detailed testimony

over the course of almost four hours (R. 304:5-150).
8.

Ms. Richardson testified, among other things, that the

parties' two oldest children attended college while living with the
Richardsons, and that the parties continued to financially support
them during that time (R. 304:31:3-11).
9.

After entertaining

closing arguments by counsel, the

trial court took the case under advisement (R. 304:151-93).
10.

About four months later, on June 2, 2005, the trial court

issued a fourteen-page Memorandum Decision, addressing, in detail,
the issues presented by the parties at trial (R. 46-60).

See R.

46-60, Memorandum Decision, a true and correct copy of which is
attached hereto as Addendum A.
11.

The trial court awarded Ms. Richardson, as the primary

caretaker of the children, sole physical and legal custody of the
parties' minor children (R. 47).
12.

In

its

Memorandum

Decision,

the

trial

court

duly

considered the underlying factors relating to an award of alimony
(R. 52-58), determining that a payment of $420 per month to Ms.
Richardson to be a "fair and reasonable award." (R. 57). The trial
5

court concluded that alimony should be paid for a period equal to
the length of the marriage, which was approximately twenty-five
(Id.).

years
13.

In conjunction with the alimony award, the trial court

found that "a good part of the income needed by Ms. Richardson to
maintain the appropriate standard of living is also attributable to
child support payments'7 from Mr. Richardson

(Id.)

.

The court

determined that as the parties' children reach the age of eighteen,
over the next few years, Ms. Richardson's ''income will be reduced
disproportionately to the reduction of expenses both because the
reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children
will not necessarily diminish to zero as they reach 18 years old"
and,

additionally,

utilities

"because

some

expenses,

such

and so on will not necessarily be

as mortgage,

significantly or

proportionately reduced even when children do leave the home."
(Id.).

14.

Based on this, the trial court concluded "that it is

reasonable to increase alimony to some extent as [Ms. Richardson's]
income

from

child

support

payments

goes

down

and

as

Richardson's] expenses from such payments also diminish."

[Mr.
(Id.).

According to the trial court, u[t]his also contributes to the goal
of maintaining a rough equivalence in the parties' standard of
living after this long-term marriage."
6

(Id.).

15.

To implement the foregoing, the trial court determined

that the "alimony payments due to [Ms. Richardson] should therefore
increase by $100 per month, beginning the first day of the month
after which each child turns eighteen" so that "when the last child
turns eighteen, [Mr. Richardson's] income will have increased by
about $1,375 per month, while commensurate alimony increases to
[Ms.

Richardson] will amount

to $400 per month,

leaving

[Mr.

Richardson] with some cushion that takes into account the purported
increased cost of living in Alaska and not reducing his standard of
{Id.).

living below [Ms. Richardson]."
16.

Mr. Richardson subsequently filed a Motion and Memorandum

for Reconsideration of Court's Ruling, asking that the trial court
reconsider its findings and conclusions contained in its Memorandum
Decision concerning, among other things, the award of alimony (R.
61-69).

See R. 61-69, Motion and Memorandum for Reconsideration of

Court's Ruling, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto
as Addendum B.
17.
70-81).

Ms. Richardson responded with an opposing Memorandum (R.
See R. 70-81, Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for

Reconsideration of Court's Ruling, a true and correct copy of which
is attached hereto as Addendum C.
18.
a

The trial court, approximately five months later, issued

thirteen-page

Memorandum Decision
7

(R. 103-17),

granting the

Motion in part and denying it in part.

See R. 103-17, Memorandum

Decision, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as
Addendum D.
19.

Thereafter, the trial court issued its Findings of Fact

and Conclusions together with the Decree of Divorce

(R. 213-41).

See R. 213-41, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the
Decree of Divorce, a true and correct copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum E.
20.

Mr. Richardson appealed

21.

After

full

Memorandum Decision

briefing,
in which

(R. 257-58).
the

court

it affirmed

of

appeals

the award of

issued

a

alimony,

concluding "that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding Ms. Richardson incremental
child support payments terminate."

increases
See Richardson

in alimony as her
v.

Richardson,

2007 UT App 222U, a true and correct copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum F.
22.

Mr. Richardson filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

This Court granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari as to the
following specific issue:
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the
district court's award of an additional amount for
alimony as each child of the Petitioner and Respondent
reaches majority and Petitioner's obligation to pay
support for each child terminates.

8

See Order granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, dated October
23, 2007, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as
Addendum G.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.
broad

The court of appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's

discretion

in

issuing

an

equitable

order

alimony upon the termination of child support.

for

increased

By so doing, the

court of appeals correctly determined that the trial court duly
considered Ms. Richardson's financial needs, her ability to support
herself, and Mr. Richardson's ability to provide support.
The court of appeals' affirmance of the trial court's award of
increased alimony is not only consonant with this Court's stated
purpose of alimony, it is consistent with the dictates set forth in
both Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (c) ("the court shall consider all
relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion,
base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of
trial") and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (d) (vx[t]he court may, under
appropriate

circumstances,

attempt

to

equalize

the

parties'

respective standards of living").
The trial court's award of increased alimony, as affirmed by
the court of appeals, constituted an "equitable order" relating to
the obligations of the parties, which the trial

9

court

rendered

after due consideration of the parties' financial positions and
their standard of

living.

Consequently,

the

court of appeals'

affirmance of the trial court's award of increased alimony upon the
termination of child support constitutes an attempt to equalize the
parties' respective standards of living after a long-term marriage.
The trial court's award, affirmed by the court of appeals, was not
based

on

speculation,

but

rather

on

specific

and

detailed

circumstances foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
In

the

course

of

advancing

his

argument

in

the

court

of

appeals, Mr. Richardson neglected to follow a critical requirement
underlying both appellate procedure and appellate advocacy, namely,
the duty to marshal the evidence when challenging the trial court's
findings

of

appeals,

Mr. Richardson

simply

fact.

involving

In his arguments presented
couched

the

increased

an abuse of the trial

to the court
alimony

issue

court's discretion

actually he challenged the trial court's underlying
fact supporting the increased alimony award.

of
as

when

findings of

In other words, Mr.

Richardson simply took the same position as that in his Motion for
reconsideration

presented

evidence on appeal.

to

the

trial

court,

rearguing

the

By so doing, he made no attempt to marshal the

evidence supporting the trial court's findings and then show that
the findings are unsupported.

10

2.

Mr. Richardson, as Petitioner, is precluded from raising

the tax results issue on certiorari due to the failure to preserve
this issue in both the trial court and the court of appeals.

To

preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity
to rule on that issue.
underlying

principles

This preservation requirement and its

apply

not

only to

the

trial

court

but

throughout the appellate process.
The record on appeal evinces an awareness by Petitioner at
trial of the alleged tax results issue.

Moreover, it demonstrates

that the argument generally made by Petitioner during closing
argument, being wholly unsupported, did not alert the trial court
to

the

argument

certiorari.

that

now

attempts

to

raise

on

Further, Petitioner presented no tax results issue to

the court of appeals.
reach

Petitioner

Petitioner's

Consequently, this Court should decline to

tax

results

issue

because

it

was

neither

properly preserved in the trial court nor properly presented to the
court of appeals.
In the event that this Court were to reach the tax results
issue, Petitioner's argument is still without merit.
court's

ruling

clearly

refers

to

the

increase

as

The trial
"alimony".

Nowhere does the trial court refer to it as support for adult

11

children.

In sum, any supposed confusion under the tax code is

specious at best.

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL
COURT'S BROAD DISCRETION IN ISSUING AN EQUITABLE
ORDER FOR INCREASED ALIMONY UPON THE TERMINATION OF
CHILD SUPPORT.
n

According to well-settled Utah law,

[t]he trial court has
Jones

broad latitude" in making orders to establish alimony.
Jones,

700 P.2d 1072, 1074

676 P.2d 379, 382

(Utah 1983); Dority

(Utah

English

1982)/

1977)).

and

v.

English,

v.

Dority,
565

v.

Higley,

645 P.2d 56, 59

P.2d

409,

410

Further, the trial court's alimony determinations

entitled to a presumption of validity."
1055,

(citing Higley

(Utah 1985)

1056

Hansen

(Utah Ct. App. ) , cert, denied,

v.

v. Hansen,
765

P.2d

(Utah
"are

736 P. 2d
1277

(Utah

1987)).
As described by this Court, " ' [T]he most important function of
alimony is to provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at
the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage, and to
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge.'"
at 1075 (quoting English,

565 P.2d at 4 1 1 ) .

Jones,

700 P.2d

In determining alimony

awards, "the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable
principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard
of living that existed at the time of trial."

12

Utah Code Ann. § 30-

3-5(8) (c)

(Supp.

appropriate

2005).

Furthermore,

circumstances,

attempt

respective standards of living."
(Supp. 2005).

"[t]he

to

court

equalize

may,

the

under

parties'

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (d)

The alimony award will not be disturbed by this

Court "so long as the trial court exercises its discretion within
the bounds and under the standards" set by this Court

and has

supported its decision with adequate findings and conclusions.
Davis

v. Davis,

749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988); Jones,

See

700 P.2d at

1074 .
This

Court

articulated

the

following

considered in determining alimony awards:
and

condition

recipient

of

the

spouse to provide

herself;

and

(3)

support.

See

Jones,

12. 1

recipient

The court

the

spouse;

of

the

to

ability

income

payor

correctly determined

of

for himself

spouse

700 P.2d at 1075; English,

of appeals

factors

be

(1) the financial needs
(2) the

a sufficient

ability

three

to

the
or

provide

565 P.2d at 411that the

trial

court had duly considered Ms. Richardson's financial needs, her
ability to support herself, and Mr. Richardson's ability to provide

j

The trial court is also to consider the following additional
factors in determining alimony: the length of the marriage; whether
the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated
by the payor spouse; and whether the recipient spouse directly
contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for
education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse
to attend school during the marriage.
See Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(8)(a)(iv)-(vii) (Supp. 2005); see R. 224-29.
13

support.
see

See

also

Richardson

R.

214,

v. Richardson,
224-29

2007 UT App 222U, pp. 2-3;

(evincing

trial

court's

detailed

consideration of the requisite three factors).
The court of appeals' affirmance of the trial court's award of
increased alimony is not only consonant with this Court's stated
purpose of alimony, it is consistent with the dictates set forth in
both Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (c) ("the

court shall consider all

relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion,
base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of
trial") and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (d) ("[t]he court may, under
appropriate

circumstances,

attempt

respective standards of living").

to

equalize

the

parties'

This is reflected by the court

of appeals' detailed analysis of the trial court's alimony award
set

forth

in

Richardson,

the

court

of

appeals'

Memorandum

2007 UT App 222U at p. 3; see

also

Decision.

See

R. 228-29.

The

trial court's award of increased alimony, as affirmed by the court
of

appeals,

constituted

an

"equitable

order"

relating

to

the

obligations of the parties, which the trial court rendered after
due consideration of the parties' financial positions and their
standard of living.

See

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1)

(stating that

"[w]hen a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in
it

equitable

orders

relating

to

obligations, and parties).

14

children,

property,

debts

or

Mr. Richardson contends that the court of appeals erred by
affirming the trial court's automatic, future increases in its
alimony

award.

Specifically,

he argues

that

"[t]he

court of

appeals erred by affirming an order that required Mr. Richardson to
pay increased

alimony as a substitute

support for adult children."

for non-mandatory

child

See Appellant's Brief, p. 9.

Like

his argument propounded in the court of appeals, Mr. Richardson
mischaracterizes2 the considerations upon which the trial court
based its alimony award.

Contrary to Mr. Richardson's assertion,

the trial court's ruling in no way delineates that the increases in
alimony are for child support purposes.
Mr. Richardson also argues that the award of increased alimony
as the parties' children turn eighteen and child support diminishes
is contrary to law because it is speculative.
Brief, pp. 13-17.

See

Appellant's

Both the record on appeal and Utah law, however,

demonstrate otherwise.

See, e.g., R. 52-58.

This Court, in Jones

v. Jones,

700 P.2d 1072

(Utah 1985),

determined that the trial court's award of alimony was inadequate
to allow the wife a standard of living even approaching
experienced during the marriage.

that

In the course of its decision,

the Court provided the following description of the marriage:
2

See Richardson
v. Richardson,
2 007 UT App 222U, pp. 1-2 (stating
"that Mr. Richardson mischaracterizes the considerations upon which
the trial court based the increases in alimony").
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During most of the marriage, with the full
consent and support of her husband, [the wife]
devoted her time to raising their four
children and donating her services to various
social service organizations . . . .
It is
entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman in
her
mid-50's
with
no
substantial
work
experience or training will be able to enter
the job market and support herself in anything
even resembling the style in which the couple
had been living.
Id,

at 1075; see also

Howell

v. Howell,

806 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah

Ct. App. 1991) (considering the appropriateness of alimony after a
long term marriage, where the wife (usually) has worked primarily
in the home, has limited job skills, and is in her late forties or
fifties).
As recognized by the court of appeals, the parties in the
instant case had a long-term marriage, which, in turn, resulted in
six

children.

Richardson,

2007

UT App

222U

at

p.

2.

Ms.

Richardson, for both the benefit of the family and Mr. Richardson's
career, sacrificed her ability to acquire significant work skills
and earning capacity to be the primary caretaker for a large family
(R. 224, 228). Moreover, Ms. Richardson is middle-aged and is not
likely

to

significantly

increase

her

earning

standard of living enjoyed by the parties

capacity

to

the

(Id.).

Consequently, the court of appeals' affirmance of the trial
court's award of increased alimony upon the termination of child
support constitutes an attempt to equalize the parties' respective
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standards of living after a long-term marriage.
award,

affirmed

by

the

court

of

appeals,

The trial court's
was

not

based

on

speculation, but rather on specific and detailed circumstances
''foreseeable at the time of the divorce."

See Utah Code Ann. § 30-

3-5(8) (g) (i) ; see R. 52-58 (demonstrating detailed consideration by
trial court of the parties' specific circumstances).
Generally, an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed
from "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent
on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that
stated by the" lower court to be the basis of its ruling.
Bailey

v. Bayles,

McPhie,

See

2002 UT 58, ^10, 52 P.3d 1158 (quoting Dipoma v.

2001 UT 61, 1} 18, 29 P. 3d 1225.

The appellate court will

address an alternative ground for affirmance if it is apparent from
the record and briefed and argued on appeal.

Dipoma,

2001 UT 61 at

118.
Mr. Richardson's primary argument is that the court of appeals
should not have affirmed the trial court's issuance of an order for
increased alimony upon the termination of child support.

In the

course of advancing his argument before the court of appeals, Mr.
Richardson neglected to follow a critical requirement underlying
both appellate procedure and appellate advocacy, namely, the duty
to marshal the evidence when challenging the trial court's findings
of fact.

Saunders

v. Sharp,

806 P. 2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) (wIf the
17

appellant

fails

to marshal

the evidence,

the appellate

court

assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court .
. . .") .

In his argument presented to the court of appeals, Mr.

Richardson couched the increased alimony issue as simply involving
an

abuse

of

the

trial

court's

discretion

when

actually

he

challenged the trial court's underlying findings of fact supporting
the increased alimony award.

See Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-13.3

When challenging the trial court's findings of fact, " [a]n
[ajppellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear
weight of the evidence."
886 (Utah 1989) .

In re Estate of

Bartell,

111 P. 2d 885,

The burden of overturning factual findings is a

heavy one, reflecting the policy that appellate courts do not sit
to retry cases.

Id.

In the court of appeals, Mr. Richardson simply took the same
position as that in his Motion for reconsideration presented to the
trial court, rearguing his evidence on appeal.4
made no attempt

to marshal

the evidence

3

Findings of fact are overturned
erroneous. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

By so doing, he

supporting

only

the trial

if they are clearly

Voreover, Mr. Richardson did not challenge the trial court's
findings of fact concerning the estimation of his income, which
served both as the basis and a material consideration underlying the
trial court's award of increased alimony.
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court's findings and then show that the findings are unsupported.
In the course of making the award of increased alimony, the trial
court entered, among other things, the following detailed findings
of fact
1.

Ms. Richardson, by agreement of the parties and as
the "primary caretaker of the children prior to the
parties' separation" is entitled to "sole physical
and legal custody" (R. 2 1 4 ) ;

2.

Mr. Richardson's income for purposes of child
support and alimony "is a total of $65,000 per
year, or $5,417.00 per month" (see R. 216), and,
after deductions, his net income before any alimony
tax benefits is $4,465.00 (R. 2 2 6 ) ;

3.

Mr.
Richardson's
"reasonable
expenses"
are
$3,628.00 and therefore he has a "surplus of net
income over expenses of about $837.00 per month"
(R. 227); 5

4.

Ms. Richardson's annual salary is "$21,927.00 or
$1,827.00 per month" (see
R. 2 1 7 ) , and, after
deductions, "[h]er net income for alimony purposes
is
$1,512.00, and with the child support
payment of $1,375.00 per month, her total net
income "is therefore about $2,897.00" (see R. 224);

5.

Ms. Richardson's "work experience is relatively
minimal because of the parties' decisions regarding
how
their
family
would
function
during
the
marriage, with only short periods of part time
employment, and she does not appear to have
developed any specialized job skills."
{Id.);

5T

By way of its Findings of Fact, the trial court noted that
"[n]either party presented much evidence of their standard of living
at the time of separation" and consequently, the court relied
"primarily on evidence regarding their expenses as a fair substitute
or approximation." See R. 224.
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"There was no evidence that [Ms. Richardson] had
either the opportunity or the capacity to earn more
than what she is making now" and "she is fully
employed in her present position at the present
rate of pay"
(Id.);
Ms. Richardson's general expenses "are reasonable,
especially considering that she is caring for four
(4) children" (see R. 224) and that her expenses
total "$3,306.00 per month", and that a "deficit
between
her
income,
including
initial
child
support, and her reasonable expenses is therefore
about $409.00 per month" (R. 2 2 5 ) ;
"[I]t is significant that this is a long term
marriage in which [Ms. Richardson] gave up her
ability to improve her skills and earning capacity
to care for a large family" (R. 2 2 8 ) ;
"[T]hat alimony in the amount of $420.00 is a fair
and reasonable award"
(Id.);
"While a significant amount of [Ms. Richardson's]
expenses can now be attributed to minor children in
the home, a good part of the income needed by [her]
to maintain the appropriate standard of living is
also attributable to child support payments from
[Mr. Richardson]."
(Id.);
Because the children will reach the age of eighteen
(18) by way of regular occurrence over the next few
years, Ms. Richardson's "income will be reduced
disproportionately to the reduction of expenses
both because the reasonable expenses associated for
a
time
even
with
older
children
will
not
necessarily diminish to zero as they reach eighteen
and because expenses
. . . will not
necessarily be significantly or proportionately
reduce[d] even when children do leave home" (R.
228-29) ;
"[I]t is reasonable to increase alimony to some
extent as [Ms. Richardson's] income from child
support
payments
goes
down
and
as
[Mr.
Richardson's] expenses from such payments also
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diminish" and u[t]his also contributes to the goal
of maintaining a rough equivalence in the parties'
standard of living after a long-term marriage." (R.
229) ;
13.

"The alimony payments . . . should therefore
increase by $100.00 per month, beginning the first
day of the month after which each child turns
eighteen (18)"
{Id.);

14.

u

0n this basis, when the last child turns eighteen
(18),
[Mr.
Richardson's]
income
will
have
increase[d] by about $1,375.00 per month, while
commensurate alimony increases to [Ms. Richardson]
will amount to $400.00 per month, leaving him with
some cushion that takes into account the purported
increased costs of living in Alaska" and not
reducing the parties' standard of living
(Id.).

For this reason alone, which provides

an alternate ground

to

affirm, this Court should affirm the court of appeals' affirmance
of the trial court's award of increased alimony.

II,

PETITIONER IS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING THE TAX
RESULTS ISSUE ON CERTIORARI DUE TO THE FAILURE TO
PRESERVE THIS ISSUE IN BOTH THE TRIAL COURT AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS.

The ruling from which Mr. Richardson appeals is the same award
of alimony initially rendered by the trial court in its original
Memorandum

Decision

issued

in

June

2005.

Nevertheless,

for

essentially the first time in these proceedings, Mr. Richardson
argues that "[t]he precedent set by the court of appeals causes
confusing and inconsistent tax results."
pp. 17-19.
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See Appellant's Brief,

u

[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal [,] the issue must

be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court
has an opportunity to rule on that issue/'
Park,
v.

Ltd.

v. Peebles,

Brooklyn

Canal

Brookside

Mobile

Home
Badger

2002 UT 48, fll4, 48 P.3d 968 (citing
Co.,

966 P.2d

844, 847

(Utah 1998)).

This

preservation requirement places the trial court on notice of the
asserted error and provides the trial court an opportunity for
correction
proceeding.

at
See

that

time

438 Main

in

the

Street

f51, 99 P.3d 801 (citing Badger,

v.

course
Easy

of

Heat,

the

trial

court

Inc.,

2004 UT 72,

966 P.2d at 847).

For the trial

court to be afforded the opportunity to correct the asserted error
"x (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion [,]

(2) the issue

must be specifically raised [,] and (3) the challenging party must
introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.'"
(citing Brookside,

2002 UT 48 at fl4, 48 P.3d 968 (quoting

966 P.2d at 847)).

Id.

Badger,

"'Issues that are not raised at trial are

usually deemed waived.'"

Id.

This preservation requirement and

its underlying principles apply not only to the trial court but
throughout the appellate process.

See State

v. Worwood,

2 007 UT

47, ff18-19, 164 P.3d 397 (declining to reach state constitutional
claim because petitioner, on certiorari, neither properly preserved
the claim in the trial court nor properly presented it to the court
of appeals).
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Petitioner concedes on certiorari that he failed to raise the
tax results issue.

See Appellant's Brief, p. 1.

As justification

for the failure, Petitioner disingenuously claims that "[t]he tax
issues were not raised because they did not become apparent until
See

the Court of Appeals issued its decision."
Petitioner's claim is without merit.

id.

The record demonstrates

that any tax issue resulting from the trial court's alimony award
was as apparent at the time of the trial court's ruling as it was
when

the

court

of

appeals

affirmed

the

same

by way

of

its

Memorandum Decision.
The closing argument of Petitioner's counsel also contradicts
Petitioner's claim.

In the course of presenting closing argument,

Petitioner's counsel advanced the following:
And there's another more practical reason why we
shouldn't. There is [sic] existing cases and tax cases
that say as soon as you start tying alimony to child
support, there is going to be a significant problem in
that the whole amount could be calculated as alimony and
when that happens there is a horrendous tax consequence
and I'm not so sure that this petitioner wants to go in
that direction and so as a practical matter, as a legal
matter, we believe this case needs to be decided today on
the facts that exist today.
(304:179:9-17).

The aforementioned portion of Petitioner's closing

argument evinces an awareness by Petitioner of the alleged tax
results issue.

Moreover, it demonstrates that the argument, being

wholly unsupported, did not alert the trial court to the argument
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that Petitioner now attempts to raise on certiorari.6

Further,

Petitioner did not present the tax results issue to the court of
appeals.

Consequently, because Petitioner's tax results issue was

neither

properly

preserved

in

the

trial

court

nor

properly

presented to the court of appeals, this Court should decline to
reach it.
In the event that this Court were to reach the tax results
issue, Petitioner's argument is still without merit.

The trial

court's ruling clearly delineates the increase as "alimony" (See R.
229

(specifically concluding that "it is reasonable to increase

alimony

to some extent as

[Ms. Richardson's] income from child

support payments goes down and as [Mr. Richardson's] expenses from
such payments also diminish.") (Emphasis added)).

Nowhere does the

trial court refer to it as support for adult children.

In sum, any

supposed confusion under the tax code is specious at best.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Richardson respectfully asks that
this Court affirm the trial court's award of alimony, and that the

6

The trial court, in its Memorandum Decision, noted that "[t]here
was no evidence of the effect of alimony payments on [Mr.
Richardson's] tax liability or alimony receipt on [Ms. Richardson's],
but the court does not believe that tax considerations related to
alimony would substantially alter the conclusions reached here." See
R. 53 n.2, Memorandum Decision.
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Court

grant

her

any

other

relief

the

Court

deems

just

appropriate under the circumstances.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of January, 2008.
ARNOLD \& WIGGINS, P.C.
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Tab A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Issues presented at trial)

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 034905249
Judge Stephen L. Roth

KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON,
Respondent.

The bench trial in this matter took place on February 8, 2005, with Joseph L. Nemelka,
Joseph Lee Nemelka, P.C, representing petitioner Kynda Kay Richardson ("Kynda") and J. Bruce
Reading, Scalley & Reading, P.C, representing respondent Kenneth Andrew Richardson
("Kenneth"). Having considered the evidence presented at trial and the arguments of counsel, the
court makes the following decision.
DECISION
A.

JURISDICTION and GROUNDS.
As a threshold matter, the court notes that Kynda has lived in Salt Lake County since January

2003, soon after the separation of the parties in about mid-2002, and therefore concludes that it has
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this case. Further, the parties have come to
disagree deeply over crucial aspects of their life together, perhaps most importantly over the
approach to raising and disciplining their children. While Kenneth states that he does not desire a
divorce, the parties had the benefit of counseling before the filing of the Petition, have been
separated for over two years and have established separate lives. The court concludes that there are

grounds for entering a decree of divorce based on the existence of irreconcilable differences that
prevent the marriage from continuing.
B.

CHILD CUSTODY and SUPPORT
There were six children born to this marriage, of whom four are still minors: Dana May

Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyle Allen Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen
Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin Wallace Richardson, born march 25, 1993. The
parties do not contest child custody and appear to be in agreement that Kynda should have sole
physical and legal custody. Kynda was the primary caretaker for the children prior to the parties'
separation and the children continue to live with her at their present home in West Valley City, while
Kenneth has remained in Alaska, where the parties lived since their marriage in Anchorage on
August 20, 1980. Kynda appears to strongly desire custody, and she has been and continues to be
a fit parent. There is no indication that the children have any different custody preference. The court
concludes that Kynda is and has been a fit and proper parent, that there is no reason to disturb the
parties' own agreement with respect to custody, and that it is in the best interests of the children that
she be awarded sole physical and legal custody. Parent time issues will be addressed below.
For purposes of the child support calculation, gross income includes income from almost any
source, other than those specifically excluded by the statute. SeeU.C.A. § 78-45-7.7(1). At the time
of trial Kenneth was working full time for Aurora Electric in Anchorage as a project
manager/estimator, earning a salary of $ 1,188.47 per week according to a January 28,2005 employer
earnings statement about $61,800 per year. Apparently some time in 2003, after the parties'
separation, Kenneth was promoted to this supervisory position from the journeyman electrician
position that he had formerly held at Aurora Electric. He received a lower salary in the prior
position, but normally and consistently worked substantial overtime (more than 40 hours per week)
-2-

during the marriage and thus earned about $5>000 (2001 W-2) to $6,000 (2002 W-2) more each year
than he does now, because, as a supervisor, overtime is no longer available to him. Kenneth testified
that he took the promotion because it was a job change that he wanted and because his boss urged
him to take the new position for the benefit of the company. While there is no indication other than
timing that Kenneth took the promotion in order to deliberately reduce his income for purposes of
this proceeding, this was in significant part a voluntary decision on his part that reduced his income.
For this reason, the court believes that it is fair to consider his previous scrapping activities (in which
he made up to $1,000 per year from time to time) as a source of income still open to him and to
consider his historical overtime. In all, the court believes that it is reasonable to impute $1,700 per
year as a reasonable assessment of Kenneth's additional earning capacity for purposes of child
support and alimony calculations, giving him some latitude to make changes in his work position
to accommodate reasonable work-related goals, while recognizing that those changes are largely
voluntary, as well as taking into account his ability to make additional income, as he has in the past,
from scrapping or other work.
In addition, Kenneth receives an annual distribution made to all citizens of the State of
Alaska. The most recent such distribution was $ 1,984, and Kenneth testified that it was sometimes
less and sometimes more. This annual payment falls within the broad scope of gross income under
the statute, and the court concludes that the $ 1,984 figure is a reasonable estimate of ongoing income
from this source for purposes of calculating gross income (for child support and alimony).
Kenneth's gross income for child support purposes is therefore $61,800 plus $1,700 plus $1,984: a
total of $65,484 per year or $5,457 per month.
Kynda is employed by the State of Utah, working full time. Her last pay stub for 2004
showed her annual salary to be $21,927 or $ 1,827 per month. Kynda's work experience is relatively
-3-

minimal because of the parties' decisions regarding how their family would function during the
marriage. After about a year of employment, Kynda cared for the children at home during the
marriage, with only short periods of part time employment, and she does not appear to have
developed any specialized job skills. There was no evidence that she had either the opportunity or
the capacity to earn more than what she is making now; and the court concludes that she is fully
employed in her present position at her present rate of pay, which is her gross income.
There was no evidence that either party was obligated to any other person for alimony or
child support outside the bounds of this case, and therefore gross income and adjusted gross income
are the same for each party. These figures are therefore to be used for calculating the share of child
support attributable to each party, with Kenneth to be the obligated party.
The parties propose that they should each be allocated tax deductions for two children, but
disagree on which. No real basis for allocation was presented other than the representation that
Kynda needed at least one child deduction to be eligible for a tax benefit. It therefore appears to the
court that it is fair to allocate the tax deductions as follows: Dana and Justin to Kynda and Kyle and
Avery to Kenneth. When Dana reaches eighteen, the exemptions should alternate to equalize the
benefits as much as possible, with Kenneth having the deductions for two children and Kynda for
one the first year in which there are only three deductions available, Kynda having two and Kenneth
one in the second year, and so on. When the deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may
claim one deduction; when there is only one deduction left, that deduction goes to Kynda. In the
alternative, for any tax year the party for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to
purchase the option(s) from the other party for the amount the other party would lose if the
exemption were not available.
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Child support should be paid retroactive from date of separation (which the court believes
was sometime around January 2003), with Kenneth to be credited for amounts paid since that time
against his obligations for child support and alimony.
C.

PERSONAL PROPERTY
The evidence at trial indicated disagreement over the value and division of the certain

personal property acquired during the marriage. This involved essentially a savings account
containing about $1,000, a certificate of deposit in the amount of approximately $6,000, a set of
firearms collected by Kenneth, tools, certain items of apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor,
and three vehicles: a van in Kynda's possession and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003
Ford Ranger) in Kenneth's possession. The parties agreed at the end of trial that Kynda receive the
savings account, the certificate of deposit and the van and that Kenneth be awarded the two trucks,
the tools, the firearm collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items. The court has no reason to
believe that this division is not fair and equitable and therefore concludes that it is.
There is also a New York Life insurance policy on Kenneth's life with a $50,000 face amount
and a cash value of about $6,300. Kenneth proposed that the policy be cashed out and the proceeds
be shared equally between him and Kynda. It was not clear to the court what Kynda wanted in this
regard. It appears to the court that it would be of some value to the parties and in the children's
interest to keep the insurance policy in place, with Kenneth to pay the premiums, having the minor
children irrevocably designated as the beneficiaries and Kynda as the trustee for the minor children.
Once the last child is emancipated, the policy is to be cashed in, with Kynda to receive within 60
days thereafter one-half of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time of trial. The parties
have the option, if they both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now, with the amount received
in payment to be divided equally between them.
-5-

D.

REAL PROPERTY
There are two parcels of real property at issue, the marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near

Anchorage, and an unimproved, .92 acre lot located in subdivision in Willow, Alaska. Neither
property is encumbered by a mortgage or other significant lien. The parties appear to agree that the
equity in each property should be divided between them, but they disagree about the value of each
property.
Kynda believed the Willow lot to be worth about $10,000, based on unspecified calls to real
estate agents in the area. Kenneth estimated the lot to be worth $3,000 to $4,000 and said that it had
an assessment value on the tax notice of $4,200. The court believes that an estimated value of
$5,000 is reasonable approximation of the value of the lot, given the sparse information presented.
Kynda is to receive $2,500 as her share of the Willow lot's value.
The Eagle River home was purchased about 20 years ago for about $50,000. It was appraised
in early 2004 at $60,000. Kenneth says the appraisal is incorrect because it indicates that the house,
a modular house, has sanitary sewer, asphalt street and curb and gutter, which is does not have. He
believes it is worth $47,000 based on a tax assessment and on his estimate that it will take about
$13,000 to connect the house to municipal sewer, a step he says is necessary to make the house
saleable. Kynda says she believes the appraisal is correct, even without a sewer hook-up, and that
the house cannot have depreciated in value since it was purchased. The appraisal indicates that
property values in the area are increasing, and no evidence was presented on how property tax
assessments were made. Kenneth has presented no reliable evidence of the effect on property value
of the lack of a sewer hook-up, much less that the value would be directly related to the cost of
providing such an improvement. Nor has he presented any evidence of how property tax
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assessments are made in the area or how reliable an indication of actual value they are or that
property values have decreased since the purchase of the property for $50,000 over twenty years ago.
The court believes that the appraisal is the most reliable indication of value under the
circumstances and finds that the house is worth $60,000 at the time of trial and the equity should be
divided equally, with the house to be sold and the net proceeds split equally between the parties. In
the alternative, if Kenneth wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000 to Kynda.
E.

ALIMONY
"[T]he purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from becoming a public charge

and to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage to the extent possible." Howell
v. Howell, 806P.2d 1209,1212 (Ut.Ct.App. 1991), citing Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218,1223
(Utah 1980). The Supreme Court, in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), set out "three
factors that must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony award: [1] the financial conditions
and needs of the wife; [2] the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself; and [3]
the ability of the husband to provide support." Id. at 1075 (edits by the court; citations omitted);
U.C. A. § 30-3-5(8) (which expands the number of factors to be considered, while retaining the Jones
factors as the essence of the inquiry). After the determination of the needs and resources of both
parties using the Jones factors, "the court should set alimony as permitted by those parameters, to
approximate the parties' standard of living during the marriage as closely as possible." Howell, 806
P.2d at 1212. In the case of a long-term marriage, the alimony award "should, 'to the extent
possible, equalize the parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as close as
possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.'" Id., quoting Gardner v. Gardner,
748 P.2d 1076,1081 (Utah 1988); cf Howell, 806 P.2d at 1216 n.4 ("The alimony award, however,
need not be large enough to maintain the receiving spouse at the standard of living enjoyed during
-7-

the marriage if that amount of alimony would lower the standard of living of the paying spouse
below that of the receiving spouse."). Having considered "all relevant facts and equitable
principles," the court "may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at
the time of trial." U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)(c).
Kynda's income, as discussed above, is $ 1,827 per month. Accepting the annual deductions
from her salary as set out in her 2004 year-end pay stub, they are Federal Tax ($465.10), Social
Security Tax ($ 1,286.53), Medicare Tax ($300.88), State tax ($551.73), and health dental and vision
insurance (together $1,176.52), for a total monthly deduction of about $315.00. Her net income for
alimony purposes is therefore $1,512. (The court is not considering deductions for life insurance for
either party because essentially voluntary (on the part of Kynda) or building cash value from this
point forward (on the part of Kenneth)). Child support payments will be approximately $1,375 per
month. Total net income, without consideration of alimony tax consequences, is therefore about
$2,897.
As to general expense deductions, the court believes that Kynda's monthly expenses, as set
forth in Exhibit 7, are reasonable, especially considering that she is caring for four children.1 While
she filed a financial declaration earlier that stated lower expenses, the court found credible her
explanation that she had been keeping expenses deliberately low during that period because of the
financial uncertainties of the unresolved divorce and had increased her expenses to a more normal
level during 2004, the subject period for Exhibit 7. Those deductions are supported by detailed
monthly expense reports. Nevertheless, Exhibit 7 contains some expenses that the court considers

1

Neither party presented much evidence of their standard of living at the time of separation,
so the court is relying primarily on evidence regarding their expenses as a fair substitute or
approximation.
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as either one-time costs or not allowable for purposes of alimony determination. Those include
attorneys fees and mediation costs related to the divorce in the amount of $ 1,331. They also include
$1,779 in what appear to be one-time costs for the purchase of appliances ($906.10 to Maytag on
January 26 and $873.05 to Maytag on February 7), although the court believes that one-half that
amount (about $890) is a reasonable annual budget for general maintenance of a home and its
contents over the long term, given the number of children in her care and the need to furnish a
separate house, and ought to be included as an expense. Because the testimony indicated that the
parties historically have made donations to their church at about 10% of income and continue to do
so, each listing such donations as part of their expenses, the court considers these donations as a
continuing part of their previous and present standards of living and will include them as reasonable
expenses for both parties. Deducting $185 per month for one-time expenses, her reasonable
expenses are $3,306 per month.
The deficit between her income, including initial child support, and her reasonable expenses
is therefore about $409 per month.
Kenneth's income, as discussed above, is $5,457 per month. This amounts to salary of
$61,800 per year, plus$ 1,984 state payment and $ 1,700 additional attributed income, per the analysis
set forth above. Deductions, per his weekly Direct Deposit Earnings Statement, include Medicaid
($16.94), social security ($72.45), federal tax ($117.85), local tax ($5.40) and health insurance
($10.25). The court is not considering deductions for 401(k) contributions, a medical flex plan and
a 401(k) loan repayment. The loan repayment deduction (amounting to about $193 per month) is
to pay off a $ 10,000 loan Kenneth took out of his retirement plan in 2003, after the separation, to pay
attorney's fees ($5,000), a down payment on a new truck ($3,000), and a deposit in a savings account
($2,000). The court does not believe the repayments on this loan, given its timing and the use of the

proceeds, ought to be counted as a deduction from salary for alimony purposes. Other deductions
appear reasonable. Similarly, the medical flex plan is a voluntary contribution (about $10 per week)
that can be used to pay medical expenses as they arise (apparently deductibles and other expenses
not covered by insurance). Because this is essentially a medical savings plan for the benefit of the
respondent, it should not be counted as a true deduction for alimony purposes.
The total weekly deductions from salary are therefore about $223 or about $966 per month.
Including an additional $26 per month to account for a proportional amount of deductions for the
imputed $ 1700 per year (there was no evidence that the state payment of $ 1982 per year was taxed),
the total deductions are about $992 per month, leaving a net income, before any alimony tax benefit,2
of $4,465.
The expenses Kenneth listed in Exhibit 15, appeared to be generally reasonable, and the court
is using that exhibit as a base for determining Kenneth's reasonable expenses, with certain
exceptions, as discussed below. Kenneth claims total monthly expenses of $3,911.47. In addition,
if Kenneth takes out a mortgage on the Eagle River house to pay off the equity, he will have to make
payments on that loan. Because of his age, a 15-year amortization is reasonable, requiring a monthly
payment of about $250 at an interest rate of about 6%. This is a reasonable additional expense, as
Kenneth does not have any rent or mortgage payment now and intends to remain in the house and
not sell it. Further, Kenneth has allocated about $1,350 for child support payments, when the total
is closer to $1,375, based on the parties' combined incomes of about $7,284 per month, allocated
about 25% to Kynda and 75% to Kenneth. These amounts should be added as expenses.

2

There was no evidence of the effect of alimony payments on Kenneth's tax liability or
alimony receipt on Kynda's, but the court does not believe that tax considerations related to alimony
would substantially alter the conclusions reached here.
-10-
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Some expenses the court believes should not be included. As discussed above, the court does
not believe that the expenses for repayment of the 401(k) loan (about $193 per month) and life
insurance (which the court estimates at $65 per month based on the absence of any other evidence
other than respondent's claim to have $165 in monthly expenses for all insurance other than
deducted health insurance premiums) should be included for purposes of alimony determination, as
they are not necessities, and neither party urged their inclusion. In addition, Kenneth claims a total
of $350 per month in medical and dental expenses. There was no evidence of a need for health care
that would support expenses at that level, especially since he apparently has employer-provided
health insurance for which amounts are deducted from his salary; and absent any evidence of
particular health conditions requiring treatment, the court believes that $50 per month is reasonable.
Kenneth's reasonable expenses are therefore about $3,628.
Kenneth therefore has a surplus of net income over expenses of about $837 per month.3
Other than the equity in the marital home, the parties have accumulated little in the way of
resources to supplement their incomes. Considering Kynda's financial condition and needs and her
inability to provide sufficient income to meet those needs, together with Kenneth's ability to provide
support and the significant income differential between them even taking into account the payment
and receipt of child support, the court concludes that Kenneth should pay alimony to Kynda. In
addition, the court believes it is significant that this is a long term marriage in which Kynda gave up
her ability to improve her work skills and earning capacity to care for a large family, so that should
play a part in the determination of alimony amount, as well. See Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213. The

3

The court notes that, while both the parties and the court have used figures for income and
expenses that appear quite specific, these figures in reality are approximations, especially as they are
meant to ultimately represent amounts received and spent in the future. In determining alimony, the
court recognizes and takes into account the imprecision of the amounts involved.
-11-
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court believes that alimony in the amount of $420 is a fair and reasonable award. This sum
approximates the petitioner's need, before consideration of the alimony tax consequences, and falls
within respondent's capacity to pay, as determined by the court.
While a significant amount of her expenses can now be attributed to minor children in the
home, a good part of the income needed by Kynda to maintain the appropriate standard of living is
also attributable to child support payments from Kenneth. As children reach the age of eighteen,
which will be a regular occurrence over the next few years, the court believes that Kynda's income
will be reduced disproportionately to the reduction of expenses both because the reasonable expenses
associated for a time even with older children will not necessarily diminish to zero as they reach 18
years old and because some expenses, such as mortgage, utilities and so on will not necessarily be
significantly or proportionately reduced even when children do leave the home. For that reason, the
court concludes that it is reasonable to increase alimony to some extent as Kynda's income from
child support payments goes down and as Kenneth's expenses from such payments also diminish.
This also contributes to the goal of maintaining a rough equivalence in the parties' standard of living
after this long-term marriage. Id. (considering the effects of diminishing child support obligations
as children reach 18 on the relative disparity of income between spouses). The alimony payments
due to Kynda should therefore increase by $ 100 per month, beginning the first day of the month after
which each child turns eighteen. On this basis, when the last child turns eighteen, Kenneth's income
will have increased by about $1,375 per month, while commensurate alimony increases to Kynda
will amount to $400 per month, leaving him with some cushion that takes into account the purported
increased cost of living in Alaska and not reducing his standard of living below Kynda's.
Alimony should continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage. Changes in
income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be considered
-12-
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as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate. Alimony should be paid
retroactive to the time of separation.
F.

PARENT TIME
While it is apparent that Kenneth loves his children, during the marriage he took a decidedly

harsher approach to their discipline than did Kynda, going to the extreme of punishing them by the
use of a belt on occasion and threatening to do so more regularly. The court believes that this goes
beyond acceptable limits on discipline of children and it apparently played a part in the break up of
the marriage. The children remain somewhat intimidated by their father, and their distance from
him, both emotional and geographical at this point, has been exacerbated by his decision that it
would be best under the circumstances of the separation to contact them infrequently. While his
telephone contacts have recently increased, he has seen the children only a few times since the
separation. Some or all of the children have been in counseling to deal in part with issues involving
their father.
The court believes that it is in the best interests of the children to reestablish their relationship
with their father as soon as possible and that his access to them be as liberal as the distances involved
allow, at a minimum in accordance with the applicable guidelines for parent time. Under the
circumstances, there should be a gradual increase in parent time up to guideline standards, beginning
with visits here to Salt Lake City, where Kenneth should attend counseling sessions with the
children's therapist and any further individual counseling reasonably recommended to facilitate the
transition to regular parent time. During the course of this process, the parties should formulate a
reasonable parenting plan with the input of the children's therapist, which should be in place by the
time regular visitation is ready to begin. By saying this, the court believes that the parties should

-13-
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seek the therapist's input on the nature and timing of this process and that the goal should be to make
this transitional period as short as possible.
G.

ATTORNEY FEES
Based on the court's assessment that Kynda's expenses are beyond her income and other

resources at this point and on its conclusion that Kenneth's resources provide him with a surplus
over his expenses (as discussed in connection with alimony, above), the court concludes that
Kenneth should be responsible to pay Kynda's reasonable attorney fees incurred in this matter.
Kynda has insufficient income to meet her needs, and alimony payments will bring her income up
to the point where her needs are met, not including attorney fees. Kenneth will have a level of
surplus and is more able to pay fees. Kynda should provide evidence of the amount and
reasonableness of the fees she claims to the court.
CONCLUSION
The court has set out a number of findings and conclusions in its analysis. Counsel for
petitioner is to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law that take into account other matters
that ought to be included but were resolved before trial and should include additional findings and
conclusions from the evidence presented reasonably necessary to support the court's ruling.
DATED t h i s ^ A d a y of June, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

Stephen L. Roth
DISTRICT JUD'
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Respondent, Kenneth Andrew Richardson, by and through his attorneys, moves the Court to
reconsider the findings and conclusions contained in its Memorandum Decision of June 2, 2005
(hereinafter, "Court's Ruling"). In summary, Respondent requests that the Court reconsider the following:
1.

Reconsideration of the alimony award, based upon (a) inaccurate income and deduction
figures; (b) prospective changes in the amount and retroactive application; and (c) improper
consideration of tithing payments.

2.

Petitioner's ability to pay attorney fees as a result of the retroactive alimony award.

3.

The Court's failure to give adequate guidance regarding the implementation of a parent-Ume
plan.

4.

The Court's failure to address the division of the parries' retirement accounts.
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K E N N E T H ANDREW RICHARDSON,

Respondent.

| Civil No. 034905249 DA
j Judge Stephen L. Roth
j Commissioner Susan Bradford
j

Respondent, Kenneth Andrew Richardson, by and through his attorneys, submits this
Memorandum in support of his Motion to Reconsider the ruling contained in the Memorandum Decision
of June 2, 2005 (hereinafter, "Court's Ruling"):
ARGUMENT

I.

T h e Alimony Award is Improper Because: (a) the Court's Ruling Regarding
Respondent's Income Are Inaccurate; (b) Future Changes in Alimony Are Available
Only Through a Petition to Modify; and (c) Tithing Payments Were Improperly
Considered as a Component of Petitioner's N e e d s

Because the alimony award of $420.00 per month is based upon an artificially inflated estimate of
Respondent's available income, the award should be reduced. Furthermore, under Utah law, changes in
alimony can only be made pursuant to a petition to modify. This requirement cannot be avoided by
building changes into to the findings ot fact and Conclusions ol Law (hereinafter, "Findings"), based upon

te

speculation about future events. Finally, tithing is not a proper component of Petitioner's needs for
purposes of determining alimony.
A.

T h e Ruling Overestimate Respondent's Ability to Pay Alimony

The Court's Ruling overestimates Respondent's ability to pay alimony because it overstates
Respondent's available income. Page 3 of the Ruling ragraph 4 of the Inndings of states, incorrectly, that
Respondent recently received a distribution from the state of Alaska in the amount of SI,984.00. Instead,
Petitioner actually received a distribution in the amount of $919.00, as shown at trial.
T h e Court should therefore impute ongoing payments from the state of Alaska based upon
imputed annual payments of $919.00, thus reducing Respondent's annual income by SI,065.00.
Respondent's annual income, before deductions, should therefore be $62,719.00 (or $5,226.58 per month).
After deductions of $992.00 per month, as stated in paragraph 20 of the Findings, Respondent's monthly
available income is $4,234.58 per month.
In addition, the Court has imputed income from Respondent's scrapping activity. Testimony at trial
was this scrapping was done while he was in the field working at his full-time job. He is now in
administration and does not have scrapping available to him anymore.
B.

Neither Prospective Changes in Alimony, N o r Retroactive Alimony, Can Be
Built Into a Decree of Divorce

The Court's ruling improperly implements retroactive alimony, and prospective increases in alimony
as Respondent's child support payments decrease. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(g)(n) provides, however, that
courts may not modify alimony to address the needs of a recipient that did not exist at the time of entry of
the decree of divorce. Furthermore, the Utah Court of Appeals has unequivocally stated that " any
changes

in alimony

future

are limited to instances where a material change of circumstances has occurred." See
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Uomllv. Unwell 806 V 2d 1209 (lTtah Cr \ p p 1991) (emphasis added).

/ loivellalso mandates that the "the

standard of living existing at or near the time of trial" is the appropriate benchmark for determining an
alimony award. See id. at 1212.
The Court's Ruling directly contravenes both the Howe/I decision and Utah ("ode Ann. § 30-35(g)(n). Petitioner's future needs and Respondent's future ability to pay should not be pre-judged by the
Court. See also Nelson v. Nelson, 97 P.3d 722, 723-24 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that a motion to
terminate alimony, based upon the petitioner's prospective reduction in income upon retirement, was not
ripe for decision because petitioner had not yet retired; as such there was not a justiciable "'imminent clash
of legal tights and obligations'"). If the Court prospectively increases alimony payments at specifically
scheduled future times, its decision will be based primarily upon speculation rather than upon any actual
change the circumstances of the parties.
Based upon / lowell, Nelson, and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(g)(n), the Court's Ruling should specify
what alimony should currently be, based upon Respondent's needs at the time of the entry of the divorce
decree. N o future umes or contingencies should be considered because there is no way of determining in
advance the future needs and abilities of the parties.
Likewise, the award of alimony, retroactive to the time of separation is improper. See Findings at ^|
25. As the court pointed out in Osen v. Ose/iy (Unreported Memorandum Decision), April 6, 2000, WU
33249404 (Utah Ct. App.), retroactive awards are
contrary to the intent of the statute, which allows a party to move for interim
alimony to meet the party's needs between separation and divorce. See Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3- 3(3) (1998) (stating "the court may order a party to
provide money, during the pendency of the action") (emphasis added). It
was not intended to be awarded as an afterthought in the final
decree—especially when not requested by the benefitting party. See id. \\
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30-3-3(4) (allowing amendment to interim alimony entered "prior to entry of
the final order") (emphasis added).
By failing to move for interim alimony, Petitioner waived any claim for it. Retroactive alimony
should therefore not be awarded.
C.

T h e Court's Ruling Improperly Consider Tithing Payments as a " N e e d " of
Petitioner

Because tithing payments, or other charitable giving, have nothing to do with a person's standard of
living, they should not have been considered by the Court in determining the alimony award. In
determining an alimony award, the trial court must consider, among other things, the following factors: (1)
the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (2) the earning capacity of the recipient spouse; (3)
the ability of the obligor spouse to pay alimony; and (4) the length of the marriage. See Rehn v. Relm, 974
P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); see also Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-5(8)(a)(i)-(iv).
The purpose of alimony is to "'equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living standards . . ." to
the extent possible. See Howe//v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991) (quoting Rcisband v. Rcisbund, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct.App.1980).
As far as Respondent can determine, there is no Utah case or statute that authorizes the
consideration of tithing as a factor in determining an alimony award. The Utah Court of Appeals has
defined "standard of living" as "a minimum of necessities, comforts, or luxuries that is essential to
maintaining a person in customary or proper status or circumstances." JHowe/1 v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) {citing Webster's Third New International
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Dictionary 2223 (1986)). Charitable donations and tithing are unrelated to a party's own necessities,
comforts, and luxuries, and should therefore not be considered in determining an alimony award.
II.

If Retroactive Alimony is Permitted, then Petitioner Will Have Sufficient Income to
Pay Her Attorney Fees, Making the Award of Attorney Fees to Petitioner Improper

The award of retroactive alimony, if it stands, will be a windfall for Petitioner. There was no
evidence that Petitioner incurred debts in order to survive from the dme of separation to the time of trial.
Apparently, Petitioner was able to reduce her expenses during this period and to manage her financial affairs
adequately. The award of retroactive alimony therefore amounts to $10,500.00 windfall (twenty five months
from the parties' separation to the time of trial, multiplied by $420.00). This is more than enough to enable
Petitioner to pay her attorney fees of $5,280.00, as claimed in the Affidavit of Attorney Fees filed by her
counsel in this matter.
Even if the Court believes the award of attorney fees to Petitioner is proper, Respondent object to
the Affidavit of Attorney Fees, submitted by Petitioner's counsel, because it fails to meet the requirements
of Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the rule, all such affidavits must set forth "a
reasonably detailed description of the time spent andwork performed. . ." See Utah R. Civ. P. 73(b)(2).
Petitioner's counsel merely states his hours, but fails to detail the work performed. As such, his
request fails to comply with Rule 73 and should be denied.
III.

T h e Findings Improperly Delegate the Responsibility to Determine Parent-Time to
the Parties

Section 30-3-35 of the Utah Code establishes the minimum parent time to which a noncustodial
parent is entitled "unless a parent can establish otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence that more or
less parent-time should be awarded

. ." See Utah ("ode \nn. § 30-3-34(2). No such proof was provided by
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the preponderance of the evidence. But that being said, the Court has suggested a "gradual increase in
parent time" with such transition beginning with visits in Salt Lake City with Respondent attending
counseling with the children's therapist. In addition, Respondent should attend anv individual counseling
recommended.
The problem with this procedure is the children are not in therapy, so there is no counseling to
attend. Further, many child therapists will not give therapy to adults. There is nothing in the order to
indicaute what should happen in that circumstance. Who is the individual to recommend individual
counseling and how does the individual counselor give input to the visitation schedule? More guidance is
needed.
Finally, the Court has ordered the parties to formulate a reasonable parenting plan. The Respondent
has requested visitation on at least 20 occasions since separation to the present and has only been allowed
visitation six occasions. Again, there is no child therapist in existence to assist in the parenting plan. The
parties cannot agree — that is why trial was necessary.
There is a need for further guidance from the Court.
DATED this

~~7

day of July, 2005.
SCALLEY & R E A D I N G ,

P.C.

Bpdce Reading
Attorney for Respondent

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF M O T I O N FOR RECONSIDERATION

Pa«c 6

w

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Attorney at Law
JOSEPH LEE NEMELKA, P C
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
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Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON,

;

Petitioner,

]

vs
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON,
Respondent

])

Case No 034905249 DA

;
)
])

Judge Stephen L Roth
Commissioner Susan Bradford

PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF COURT'S RULING

Petitioner, Kynda Kay Richardson, by and through her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka,
hereby submits this memorandum in opposition to Respondent's A/o/zow for Reconsideration of
Couit's Ruling, and Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration^ as
follows

ARGUMENT
I.

The Alimony Award is Appropriate
A.

The Ruling does not overestimate Respondent's Ability to Pay
Alimony

In his Memorandum Respondent argues that the Court erred by overestimating his ability
to pay alimony by "overstating [his] available income " Respondent asserts that the Court erred in
finding that he received a distribution from the State of Alaska of $1,984 per year instead of $919
per year The Court did not err in this regard Testimony at trial showed that the yearly Alaska
distribution varied anywhere from $500 to $2,000 per year Even assuming arguendo that the
Court erred in overstating this amount by $1,000, the error is harmless The monthly increase to
Respondent's income would be only $89 per month. This is not a substantial enough amount to
alter the Court's ruling
Respondent also argues that the Court should not have imputed him income from his
scrapping activity The Court did not err in this regard Testimony at trial showed that
Respondent did additional scrapping work while he was working in the field However, the
evidence also showed that Respondent has access to every job site and can still do the scrapping
work it from wherever he is regardless of his other administrative duties Moreover, the Court
considered Respondent's reduction in income to be voluntary and that his scrapping work was
something that he had done historically during the marriage For this reason, the Court thought it
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was fair to consider his previous scrapping activities which the Court specified as a previous
source of income The Court did exactly what is allowable pursuant to Utah Case Law and that
is, when there is a reduction of income, just prior to or during a divorce action being filed, then it
is perfectly reasonable to use historical and other income for purposes of establishing income for
child support and alimony calculations The Court specifically states its findings
While there is no indication other than timing that Respondent took
the promotion in order to deliberately reduce his income for
purposes of this proceeding, this was in significant part a voluntary
decision on his part that reduced his income. For this reason, the
court believes that it is fair to consider his previous scrapping
activities (in which he made up to $1,000 per year from time to
time) as a source of income still open to him and to consider his
historical overtime In all, the court believes that it is reasonable to
impute $1,700 00 per year a reasonable assessment of Kenneth's
additional earning capacity for purposes of child support and
alimony calculations, giving him some latitude to make changes in
his work position to accommodate reasonable work-related goals,
while recognizing that those changes are largely voluntary, as well
as taking into account his ability to make additional income, as he
has in the past, from scrapping or other work
Furthermore, Respondent is trying to introduce evidence that was not introduced at trial
Respondent is trying to "boot strap" additional argument into his Motion and Memorandum, and
such should be stricken

3

B.

The Court did not err in awarding Prospective Increases in Alimony,
nor did it err in Awarding Retroactive Alimony

Respondent argues that the Court improperly implemented retroactive alimony and
perspective increases of alimony as the child support payments decrease Respondent points to
§30-3-5g(ii) of the Utah Code in arguing that the Court may not modify alimony to address needs
that did not exist at the entry of the Decree of Divorce This argument is misplaced At the time
of trial, Petitioner specifically testified, in open court and by exhibit, what her expenses where.
The Court found her expenses in the sum of $3,306 00 per month to be reasonable The Court
found that Petitioner could only meet those expenses with both the alimony and child support
being paid to her The Court found that with child support of $1,374, and with a net income of
$1,512, Petitioner would need alimony of $409 to meet her expenses The Court found that as
the child support decreased, so would Petitioner's ability to pay her expenses, while Respondent's
ability to pay his expenses and alimony would increase Petitioner's expenses would remain the
same and, therefore, any increase in prospective alimony is based upon "the needs of [Petitioner]"
that exist at the "time of entry of decree of divorce," or trial The Court did not find that
Petitioner's expenses would be greater in the future and that she would therefore need more
alimony The Court simply awarded alimony based upon the information before it as to
Petitioner's needs This is a fact known and taken into consideration at trial
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The Court made further specific findings for its reasoning to increase the alimony once the
child support payments went down This was a very long-term marriage and as Respondent's
child support obligation went down as the children reached the age of eighteen (18), this would
not necessarily mean a change in the expenses for the children in Petitioner's custody Further,
the Court wanted to maintain a rough equivalence of the parties standard of living after a longterm marriage The Court recognized that as the children grow older the Respondent's income
will increase automatically, while Petitioner's expenses will not necessarily decrease
Respondent's reliance on the Howell case is misplaced The Court in Howell did state that
any future changes in alimony are limited to situations where a material change of circumstances
has occurred The Howell Court did not elaborate on that statement and the facts of the Howell
case do not assist Respondent in this case However, simply stating that the alimony will increase
incrementally, does not mean that this is a "future change" as contemplated by Howell This
Court has ruled what the alimony award would be now and as the minor children reach the age of
majority Therefore, there will be no "future" changes in alimony Of course, the Court's current
award of alimony would be changed but only if there is a substantial material change of
circumstances
Respondent also argues that Howell mandates that the standard of living existing at or
near the time of trial is the appropriate bench mark This is correct The Court looked at the
standard of living of the parties and found Petitioner's expenses to be reasonable and her income,
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including child support, left a shortfall The Court also found that Respondent had discretionary
income of $837 each and every month Thus, the Court did consider the standard of living
existing at the time of trial and, therefore, did not err The Court is not looking at the standard of
living that may occur in the future because the Court is assuming that the expenses and income of
the parties will remain the same The Court is calculating and allowing an increase in the alimony
award as child support is decreased It is fact that is known now, a fact that is forseeable and a
fact that is contemplated
Contrary to Respondent's argument, future needs and future ability to pay are not being
prejudged by the Court The Court's decision is not based upon speculation or conjecture The
decision is based upon what the Court knows now in terms of the parties' incomes and expenses,
and the fact that the Court knows now that the child support will go down
The Court could have very well found that alimony should be awarded in the sum of
$820 00 This is roughly what is available for alimony from Respondent's surplus The Court
could very well say that the alimony award is $820 00 to be paid $420 00 now with an additional
$100 00 at each time Regardless, the outcome is still the same All of the issues are known All
of the amounts are known and, therefore, there is nothing hindering the Court's order in making
the appropriate findings in that regard Nothing of the Court's ruling violates the Howell nor
Utah Code § 30-3-5g(ii)

6

Respondent repeats several times that the concept that future contingencies should not be
considered because there is no way of determining in advance the future needs and abilities of the
parties Again, the Court is awarding alimony based upon the current ability to pay of the parties.
It is not relying on any determination of future income nor future expenses
Respondent also argues that the award of alimony retroactive at the time of separation is
improper This argument is also misplaced During the separation of the parties, Respondent was
paying support each and every month to Petitioner Such funds were not designated as child
support or alimony. Respondent argues that in order for any retroactive alimony to be awarded,
Petitioner had to bring a motion beforehand However, when one party, such as Respondent in
this case, is already paying some amount of money for support, there is simply no need to file a
motion for an interim order The Court in this matter is simply indicating that the $420 00 current
alimony award would be retroactive back to the date of the parties separation and any amounts
paid by Respondent during that time would be applied toward this obligation Petitioner could
not, therefore, have waived her ability to interim alimony as it was already being paid, albeit in an
imprecise amount Moreover, during this time the parties were negotiating to resolve the support
issues and all other issues of the divorce Requiring the parties to litigate matters over which they
are trying to negotiate a resolution would be contrary to the sense of equity, justice and judicial
economy
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C.

The Court Properly Considered Tithing as a Need of Petitioner

Respondent argues that the Court cannot consider tithing as an expense of the parties
Respondent argues that tithing payments have nothing to do with a person's standard of living
and should not have been considered in the alimony award This argument is incorrect and
somewhat disingenuous The Court in its findings specifically indicates that the evidence that the
parties
historically made donations to the Church at about ten percent
(10%) of income and continue to do so, each listing such donations
as part of their expenses and the Court considers these donations as
a continuing part of their previous and present standards of living
and will include them as reasonable expenses for both parties
Thus, the Court allowed both parties to claim tithing as an expense and part of their
standards of living Both parties were treated equally in this regard, although allowing
Respondent to claim his alimony as an expense provides him an even greater monthly amount of
discretionary income an additional $495 Respondent points to a number of cases that he asserts
support his position that the Court cannot consider tithing as part of a standard of living
Respondent states that none of these cases authorizes a Court to consider alimony as an expense
However, Respondent ignores the fact that no case law or statutory authority prohibits the Court
from considering tithing as a factor in determining an alimony award In fact, the Court is
supposed to consider the "financial condition" of the parties In Howell^ the Utah Court of
Appeals did define the standard of living as a "minimum of necessities, comforts or luxuries that is
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essential to maintaining a person in customary or proper status or circumstances " Howell does
not, however, further delineate what is meant by the foregoing language Common sense dictates
that "customary" means what the parties were use to or the status quo "Luxuries" would include
expenses that are not necessary for minimal survival, but for things such as vacations, golf lessons,
tanning, etc Luxuries could also very easily include tithing or donations If Respondent did not
believe that the Court should consider tithing or donations, why did he expect the Court to
consider his donations as an expense?
As Howell indicates, trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony in
divorce cases and such decisions will be held upon appeal unless a clear and prejudicial use of
discretion is demonstrated No such abuse of discretion has been shown
II.

Petitioner will not have sufficient income to pay her attorney's fees even if
retroactive alimony is permitted.

Respondent claims that retroactive alimony would be a windfall for Petitioner This is not
accurate During the time of the parties separation, Respondent has been living very frugally as
found by the Court However, Respondent has been able to enjoy a greater standard of living
having the greater income of the parties Furthermore, the retroactive alimony may or may not
amount to $10,500, given the fact that during the parties separation Respondent voluntarily paid
support for the minor children and for Petitioner The only fact that remains is what amounts are
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still due and owing for retroactive child support and alimony There are offsets which need to be
taken into consideration which can be included in any findings
Respondent argues that the Affidavit of Attorneys Fees fails to meet the requirements for
Rule 73 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure However, Respondent fails to recall that at trial that as
part of his exhibits, Petitioner included a detailed copy of each his attorneys fees which was
provided as an exhibit to the Court Furthermore, Petitioner's counsel indicated to the Court the
amount of the hourly fee, the complexity of the case, and that he was requesting fees This was
all made a part of record and placed with the Court as evidence. Besides, the purported Affidavit
as to Attorney's Fees has not even been filed with the Court Petitioner's counsel will submit a
sufficiently detailed and formal affidavit with the final documents
III.

The Findings do not Improperly Delegate Responsibility of Parent-time to

the Parties.
§ 30-3-35 of the Utah Code specifically indicates that any visitation or parent-time
established by the parties is preferred to a Court mandated award Respondent requests that he be
awarded the minimum parent-time pursuant to § 30-3-35 of the Utah Code However, that
statute contemplated both parents living within a reasonably close proximity Respondent lives in
Alaska and Petitioner lives in Utah Therefore, it is certainly impractical that Respondent have
parent-time one night a week and every other weekend
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Respondent's argument that no proof was provided to show that less parent-time should
be awarded is inaccurate The evidence showed, as the Court found, the level of abuse by
Respondent The fact that some of the minor children are now in counseling and the fact of
Respondent's inability and unwillingness to visit the children for substantial periods of time, all
contribute to the reasoning and the findings of the Court in that regard Evidence was placed on
the record that the children are still intimidated by their father Furthermore, the Court did in fact
order that the applicable guidelines~§ 30-3-36 of the Utah Code—would be appropriate at some
point in the future after a gradual increase occurred The Court ordered that the parties formulate
a reasonable parenting plan with the children's therapist, which should be in place before standard
parent-time occurs It is hard to see how this can be an inappropriate award or an inappropriate
procedure for establishing Respondent's parent-time The Court has given specific guidance to
the parties on how to deal with the issue If the parties are unable to resolve any parenting issues,
they should be ordered to go to mediation to assist them in resolving those issues This should
not, however, suspended the entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter
Respondent's statements that Petitioner has denied him parent-time since the trial is false,
and, once again, additional evidence he is trying to "boot strap" onto his Motion
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, pursuant to the foregoing, Petitioner requests that Respondent's Motion
for Reconsideration of Court '$ Ruling be denied and that Respondent be responsible for
Petitioner's attorney's fees incurred in responding to the Motion
DATED this \°[ (lav of

ItM,

, 2Q05

Nemelka
for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum was mailed, U S First
Class Mail, postage prepaid, this l°l* day of J t ^ S
2005, to
J Bruce Reading
SCALLEY & READING, P C
50 South Main, Suite 950
P O Box 11429
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0429
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration and Objection to
Proposed Findings and Conclusions)

Petitioner,
vs.
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON,

Case No. 034905249
Judge Stephen L. Roth

Respondent.

Respondent hasfileda Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Ruling (the "Reconsideration
Motion"), supported by his Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration ("Respondent's
Memorandum"), asking the court to reconsider certain aspects of its ruling, set out in a Memorandum
Decision, after trial in this matter. Respondent also filed an Objection to Proposed Findings and
Decree, supported by the same Respondent's Memorandum. Petitioner filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Ruling ("Petitioner's
Opposition"). Respondent filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
and filed a Notice to Submit the matter for decision on October 5, 2005. Having considered the
parties' memoranda and reconsidered the evidence and arguments presented at trial, the court makes
the following decision.
DECISION
A

THE ALIMONY AWARD.
Respondent asserts that the court's alimony award is improper because the court's assessment

of respondent's income overestimated his ability to pay, the provisions for increases in alimony
based on future reductions in child support and for retroactive alimony are contrary to law, and

tithing payments should not have been considered as a component of petitioner's needs. Each issue
is addressed below.
1.

Overestimate of Respondent's Income.

Respondent states that the court used an erroneous figure of $1984 as his 2004 annual
distribution from the State of Alaska, when his testimony was that the 2004 amount was $919, but
varied yearly. Respondent did not specify the level of variation, and the court believes that he would
have done so if it was to his advantage. The court recalls that petitioner testified that the distribution
was $1984 in 2004, that it had been about $2,000 in past years, but varied yearly. Apparently the
court misheard petitioner's testimony about the amount of the 2004 distribution, but generally found
petitioner's testimony to be credible. Accepting that the correct figure for 2004 was $919, however,
and taking into account petitioner's testimony about the level of distributions in past years of about
$2,000 but with annual variations, perhaps as low as $500, the court finds that a reasonable estimate
of respondent's income from state distributions is between $500 and $2000, with the average bearing
significantly toward the higher figure, or about $ 1,500. Taking into account this change, the court's
conclusion regarding respondent's income (as set out on page 3 of the Memorandum Decision), is
decreased by $484, from $65,484 per year to $65,000 per year, and consequently from $5,457 per
month to $5,417, a difference of $40 per month. This change is not significant, and does not affect
the court's conclusion in the Memorandum Decision about respondent's ability to pay alimony.
Respondent also states that the "scrapping" activity is no longer available to respondent,
because he did this while working in the field and he does not work in the field in his new
management job. In attributing $ 1,700 in additional income to respondent (Memorandum Decision
at 3), the court considered the fact that after the separation, respondent had voluntarily reduced his
income by taking a management job that did not allow him to benefit from the overtime that he had
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historically worked.1 The court does not believe that the testimony requires a conclusion that
respondent's previous scrapping activities are now foreclosed to him because of his new position.
In addition, the court considered these activities, undertaken during the marriage along with overtime
at work, as part of respondent's historical earning capacity that was appropriately taken into account
in light of his voluntary reduction in income.
The court therefore concludes that its ruling did not overestimate respondent's ability to pay
alimony.
2.

Future Increases in Alimony as Child Support Ends.

Respondent argues that the provision for future increases in alimony as the parties' children
turn eighteen and child support diminishes is contrary to law, because it is based on speculation
about the future needs and circumstances of the parties.
In Howell, the court noted that "Utah's appellate courts have considered the appropriateness
of alimony after a long term marriage, where the wife (usually) has worked primarily in the home,
has limited job skills, and is in her late forties or fifties." Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213 (citations
omitted). This is just such a case. The parties were married for over twenty years and had six
children. Petitioner gave up her ability to acquire significant work skills and earning capacity to care
for a large family, and continued to care for the remaining four minor children at the time of trial.
She is in her forties or fifties and is not likely to significantly increase her earning capacity to a point
where she can support herself at a standard the parties enjoyed during marriage. See Jones v. Jones,
700 P.2d 1072,1075 (Utah 1985), quoted in Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213. While an alimony award of

1

While the court has concluded that respondent did not do this for the purpose of reducing
his income, the court believes that he did accept this position, which he had declined before, in part
because the parties' separation and pending divorce decreased his incentive to continue working in
a position that provided more income but was perhaps less attractive to him as a job.
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$420 per month at this point is appropriate to address petitioner's needs, it is based on petitioner's
present sources of income, including about $1,375 in child support, which will decrease
incrementally as each of the four minor children turns eighteen. The first of those turned eighteen
in May 2005 and the second will reach majority in 2006, with the other two following.
In holding that an alimony award of $ 1,800 was "clearly erroneous" (i.e., too low) the Howell
court took note of the problem that occurs in situations where predictable decreases in child support
are not taken into account in setting alimony awards:
Child support set pursuant to child support guidelines at $1363, plus alimony of
$1800, plus defendant's potential salary as determined by the court of $645, yields
gross monthly income of $3808 for defendant and her son. Plaintiff, after deducting
child support and alimony, has gross monthly income of $6,837. When his child
support obligation ceases, approximately fifteen months after the decree, he will have
gross monthly income of $8200 in comparison to defendant's $2445. Defendant fits
the profile described in Jones and other cases: she is approximately fifty years old,
has minimal marketable job skills, and has spent most of the thirty plus years of the
parties' marriage raising and caring for their five children and their home,
presumably with the concurrence of plaintiff. Her likelihood of achieving significant
salary levels in the future is slim. The alimony set by the court does not come close
to equalizing the parties' standard of living as of the time of the divorce, but allows
plaintiff a two to four times advantage.
Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote at the end of the sentence describing the
disparity in the parties' income after child support ceases, the court quoted the statement of the Utah
Task Force on Gender and Justice Report to the Utah Judicial Council: '"If courts award child
support in lieu of permanent alimony, they may fail to anticipate the financial impact on the
remaining family as each child reached age 18 and his or her award terminates." Id at 1213 n.2
(citation omitted).
While not as dramatically as in Howell, when the Richardsons' remaining minor children turn
eighteen, the relative disparity in the parties' incomes will increase significantly. Petitioner has gross
monthly income of about $3,622, including salary at $1,827, child support of $1,375 and $420 in
-4-

alimony, from which she must provide for herself and four children. Respondent's gross monthly
income of $5,417, after deducting an equivalent amount of child support and alimony, is also
coincidental ly about $3,622,2 from which he must provide for only himself. As his child support
obligation decreases, respondent's income will increase proportionately as petitioner's decreases.
At the end of his child support obligation, less than seven years from now, with no incremental
increases in alimony respondent will have gross monthly income of about $5,000 ($5,417 less $420)
in comparison to petitioner's $2,250 ($ 1,827 plus $420). With the addition to alimony of increments
totaling $400 at the end of child support, petitioner's income will be about $2,650 in comparison to
respondent's $4,600. The court believes that incremental increases in alimony as child support
decreases reflects the reality that petitioner will continue to incur expenses that will not be reduced
dollar-for-dollar as the children reach eighteen and, perhaps more importantly, roughly meets the
goal of "better equalizing] the parties' ability to go forward with their respective lives" after this
long-term marriage. See Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213.
The court therefore concludes that the incremental increases in alimony "anticipate the
financial impact on the remaining family as each child reach[es] age 18 and his or her award
terminates" and serve to equalize the parties' abilities to go on with their lives in a rough
approximation to the standard of living during the marriage, and therefore are not based on
speculation, but on circumstances "foreseeable at the time of the divorce" {see U.C.A. § 30-35(8)(g)(i)) and fall within the compass of Utah law.

2

In its earlier Memorandum Decision, the court used net figures; these gross figures are used
simply for a rough comparison, similar to that made by the Court of Appeals in Howell.
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3.

Retroactive Award of Alimony.

Respondent argues, in effect, that the court's ruling that the alimony award should be
retroactive to the date of separation is contrary to the statutory scheme set out in U.C.A. § 30-3-3.
In support of this position, respondent cites an unpublished Court of Appeals decision, Osen v Osen,
2000 UT App 90, which reasoned that an award of alimony meant to compensate for the appellant's
not having had to pay temporary support prior to trial, to the extent it purported to be "an award of
retroactive interim alimony," was "contrary to the intent of the statute," which allows a party to move
for interim alimony to meet the party's needs between separation and divorce," Id. at n.l, citing
U.C.A. § 30-3-3(3). The court noted that temporary support "was not intended to be awarded as an
afterthought in the final decree-especially when not requested by the benefitting party." Id, citing
U.C.A. § 30-3-3(4).
Petitioner counters that no temporary support award was sought or entered because
respondent was voluntarily paying some amount of support during the pendency of the suit that was
not denominated as either child support or maintenance and that, under the circumstances, she should
not be required to have sought a temporary support order as a prerequisite to obtaining a support
award that is retroactive. She argues that this would require the parties "to litigate matters over
which they are trying to negotiate a resolution" and would not be equitable or support judicial
economy.
Osen, as an unpublished decision, does not have the force of precedent, and its analysis of
the statute is cursory and amounts to dicta, because it was simply an aside contained in a footnote
that was not necessary to the result reached. The court believes that section 30-3-3 does not impose
the constraint on retroactive support awards that respondent asserts. "The precept is well recognized
that the trial court is vested with broad equitable powers in divorce matters." Curry v Curry, 321
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P.2d 939,942 (Utah 1958). For example, in a related area these equitable powers have been found
by the Utah Court of Appeals, under applicable statutes and "Utah common law," to include "the
discretion to award modified alimony retroactively to the date a modification petition is served."
Wilde v Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, K 23. There is no evident reason why a court with statutory
authority to award temporary alimony during pending litigation and discretion to retroactively award
modified alimony would not also have discretion to make a retroactive award of temporary alimony
under its broad equitable powers. Spouses have common law and statutory duties to provide support
for dependent children and a dependent spouse. The statutory provision for temporary support orders
therefore appears to be a codification of a recognized obligation rather than the creation of a new
one. Recognizing this, it is not uncommon in this district for initial temporary support awards under
section 30-3-3 to be made retroactive to the date of filing of the petition or even to the date of
separation.
In addition, because of the inherently equitable nature of divorce proceedings, Utah courts
encourage non-litigative resolution of divorce issues through voluntary and mandatory mediation.
If retroactive temporary support was precluded by law where an order is not already in place to be
modified, parties who delayed formal litigation for temporary orders in order to reach resolution on
support issues through negotiation or mediation would be put at a significant disadvantage, and the
value and appeal of these less costly and less confrontational approaches would be reduced.
The issue then is whether in this context, the provisions of section 30-3-3 preclude the
retroactive award of support that does not amount to the modification of an existing order. Section
30-3-3 provides for an order of temporary support "during the pendency of the action" and for
amendment of "[o]rders entered under this section . . . during the course of the action or in the final
order or judgment." U.C.A § 30-3-3(3) & (4) There is nothing in this language that plainly states
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that the temporary award authorized here cannot be made retroactive. It simply provides that awards
already made can be modified. That the legislature knew how to restrict retroactive support awards
is clear from the language of U.C.A. § 78-45-9.3(3) & (4) (formerly part of U.C.A. § 30-3-10.6),
which provides clear limitations on the retroactive effect of modifications to existing awards. The
legislature apparently chose not to include such restrictions in section 30-3-3; rather, the language
of that section provides only that existing temporary orders are subject to modification. The court
concludes that it has discretion to award spousal support retroactively, particularly where the petition
requests such support, which is the case here. See Petition for Divorce, filed on August 26, 2003,
at!21.
Nevertheless, based on reconsideration of the evidence relating to the parties' pre-trial
circumstances, the court believes that the retroactive award of alimony should be modified to some
extent. The court finds from the evidence presented at trial that after the separation and petitioner's
move to Salt Lake City, respondent paid to her for some significant period of time up to $600 a week
in undifferentiated "support," apparently meant to include child support and spousal support. This
amount is substantially higher than the combined alimony and child support ordered by the court.
Once petitioner was served with the Petition for Divorce in September 2003, however, respondent
reduced his support payments to about $1,350, which he believed was the amount of child support
he would be required to pay, and which is very close to the amount required under Utah law.
Petitioner testified that her needs increased in May 2004, when her expenses increased, largely due
to taking on the costs of paying the mortgage on a house, compared with a lower monthly rental cost
before that, and associated increased utility expenses. But she also testified that she had been
significantly curtailing spending generally during that period because of her reduced circumstances
after respondent had substantially reduced his support payments after the Petition was filed, while
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respondent's circumstances did not require him to similarly economize. In setting the amount of
alimony, the court relied primarily on evidence about petitioner's financial condition and needs, and
her ability to meet those needs on her own, that appeared to be roughly similar from May 2004
forward, because that period seemed to more accurately reflect the standard of living before
separation.
Taking all this into consideration, together with the broader context of the parties' marriage,
the court believes it is equitable to make alimony retroactive to and including May 2004. The court
has considered the respondent's ability to pay support before trial, based on the court's analysis in
the original Memorandum Decision, which appears to be as pertinent to the period going back to
time of separation as to the time of trial. In addition, the court has considered the petitioner's needs,
as discussed above and in the Memorandum Decision, as well as the fact that respondent's pre-filing
support contributions were considerably larger than the court's combined child support and alimony
award, which acts to roughly offset any deficit petitioner may have experienced during the period
from filing up to May 2004.
The court further concludes that the higher amounts paid by respondent before filing are
sufficient to offset any slight deficiency in child support that may have accrued before trial.
Therefore child support need not be made retroactive.
The court's ruling set out in the Memorandum Decision is therefore modified to provide that
alimony is to be retroactive to and including May 2004 and child support is not to be retroactive, the
child support obligation having been complied with. Any overpayment of support obligations that
respondent may have made before filing was voluntary and has been taken into account in this
decision. Therefore, the court's ruling in the Memorandum Decision (at 5) that the respondent is "to

be credited for amounts paid since [the date of separation] against his obligations for child support
and alimony" is stricken.
4.

Consideration of Church Donations (Tithing).

Respondent argues that the court should not have considered the parties' contributions to
their church ("tithing") in determining the award of alimony "[bjecause tithing payments, or other
charitable giving, have nothing to do with 3 person's standard of living . . . ." Respondent's
Memorandum at 4.
Utah courts have ruled that "the court should set alimony . . . to approximate the parties'
standard of living during the marriage as closely as possible. It follows that if the payor spouse's
resources are adequate, alimony need not be limited to provide for only basic needs, but should also
considerthe recipient spouse's 'station in life.'" Howell v. Howell, 806P.2d 1209,1212 (Ut.Ct.App.
1991) (citations omitted). In this regard "4[s]tandard of living is defined as 'a minimum of
necessities, comforts, or luxuries that is essential to maintaining a person in customary or proper
status or circumstances.'"3 Id. at 1211 (dictionary citation omitted).
As the court noted in the Memorandum Decision (at 9), during the marriage the parties
historically paid a contribution to their church of 10% of income. A regular tithing payment was
thus one of the "necessities, comforts, or luxuries" that was customary in their married life and a
component of their standard of living. It is appropriately considered as part of "the financial
condition and needs of the recipient spouse" in this case. See id. at 1212. In addition, both parties
indicated that they continued to pay tithing after separation. Given the disparity in the parties'

3

Because a purpose of alimony is "to approximate the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage, to the extent possible", the "needs of the recipient spouse" are not limited to %tonly basic
needs" or the minimum necessary for subsistence, but also include "necessities, comforts, and
luxuries" enjoyed during the marriage. See Howell, 806 P.2d at 1212..
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income and petitioner's other established needs, if no allowance were made in the alimony
determination, she would likely be unable to pay tithing without sacrificing other legitimate needs.
Petitioner, on the other hand could afford to continue tithing payments without such sacrifice, and
is able to continue such payments at the level of alimony set by the court. If the court failed to
consider the parties' tithing payments as part of their standard of living, the alimony award would
fail to meet the goal of "'equalizing] the parties' respective post-divorce living standards

'" Id

at 1211 (citation omitted; modification added).
The court therefore concludes that the parties' respective church contributions were
appropriately considered in determining alimony.
B.

RETROACTIVE ALIMONY and the AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Respondent argues that if the retroactive alimony award stands, petitioner will receive a

windfall from which she should be required to pay her own attorney's fees. Alimony is an award
of spousal support based on need and is not a windfall to the recipient spouse. In this case, the court
has modified the alimony award to make it retroactive to May 2004, which appears to reduce the
amount of retroactive alimony to be paid by petitioner. Further, the court deducted attorney's fee
payments from petitioner's expenses in determining her needs for purposes of alimony, so there is
no overlap of retroactive alimony and payment for attorney's fees. Respondent's objection to the
award of attorney's fees on this basis is therefore not well taken.
Respondent also criticizes the completeness of the Affidavit of Attorney Fees submitted by
counsel for petitioner. While the Affidavit has not yet been filed, the court agrees that the Affidavit
should provide sufficient detail about the actual work performed for the court to determine whether
the fees requested were reasonable and necessary Counsel should submit an appropriate affidavit,
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incorporating the documentation submitted at trial, so the information regarding fees is readily
reviewable.
C.

PARENT TIME ISSUES.
Respondent criticizes the court's ruling regarding parent time, in particular the provision for

a gradual increase of respondent's parent time up to the level of statutory guidelines, while requiring
that he attend counseling. The court agrees that its parent-time ruling may not be workable. The
children are apparently not in therapy at this point, as the court believed; and other aspects of the
parent-time provisions are perhaps too open-ended.
The court believes its concerns, stated in the Memorandum Decision, can more realistically
be addressed by providing for parent-time per the applicable statutory guidelines, with respondent
required to successfully complete a parenting class that is functionally equivalent to the multi-week
parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on court referral. Once respondent has done this,
parent-time should begin under the applicable statutory guidelines (probably section 30-3-37 because
of the respondent's residence in Alaska). The court's primary concern is that respondent complete
the course before the children are required to go to Alaska for parent-time. If respondent comes to
Utah to visit in the interim, he may have parent-time here without having first completed the class,
so long as he gives reasonable notice. Such parent-time should be at a minimum equivalent to that
provided for in U.C.A. § 30-3-35, i.e., one weekend, to begin with the weekend just after he arrives
or the weekend on which he arrives, and at least one weeknight, unless the parties otherwise agree.
Respondent should also be given liberal access to the children for telephone communication, at least
three times per week at a minimum, and for email, if available..
The parties should contact Valley Mental Health (attn. Kathy Reimherr (cell: 556-6037)) to
determine the nature of its parenting class, and respondent can complete that program or one in
-12-

Alaska that is roughly equivalent (for example a multi-week parenting class approved by the Alaska
counterpart of DCFS). No later than 30 days from the date of this Memorandum Decision,
respondent's counsel should provide petitioner's counsel with a description of the class he intends
to take. If the parties are in agreement that the proposed class meets the requirements of this
decision, respondent should complete the class as soon as reasonably possible; if in disagreement
they should approach the court for resolution, prepared to offer specific alternatives. As soon as
respondent has provided written verification that he has successfully completed the appropriate
parenting class, visitation under the statutory guidelines can begin, including travel to Alaska.
Before completion of the course, visitation will be limited to local visits in Utah, as explained above.
The Advisory Guidelines contained in U.C.A. § 30-3-33 shall apply, as appropriate to the parties'
circumstances.
The court therefore modifies its parent-time ruling to provide for parent-time as set forth
above.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED, as follows
1.

Respondent' s Motion for Reconsideration and Objections to Proposed Findings and

Decree is granted in part and denied in part, as set forth above.
2.

The court's Memorandum Decision, dated June 2,2005, is accordingly supplemented

and modified as set forth above.
3.

Counsel for petitioner is to make appropriate modifications to the proposed findings

of fact and conclusions of law and the decree that take into account the court's ruling as set forth
herein.
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DATED this

J3my of December, 2005.
BY THE COURT

(...'\\5>^
Stephen L. Roth
DISTRICT JUDGE
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON,

]

Petitioner,

]

vs.
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON,
Respondent.

])

Case No. 034905249 DA

;
)
])

Judge Stephen L. Roth
Commissioner Susan Bradford

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Stephen L Roth of the aboveentitled Court on the 8th day of February, 2005. Petitioner appeared in person and was
represented by her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka. Respondent appeared in person and was
represented by his counsel, J Bruce Reading The Court, having heard argument of counsel and
testimony of the parties and witnesses, having reviewed the file in this matter, having taken the

matter under advisement, and being otherwise folly advised in the premises, hereby finds as
foiiows
1.

JURISDICTION AND GROUNDS: As a threshold matter, the court notes that

Petitioner has lived in Salt Lake County since January, 2003, after the separation of the parties in
about mid-2002, and therefore concludes that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter of this case Further, the parties have come to disagree deeply over crucial aspects of their
life together, perhaps most importantly over the approach to raising and disciplining their children
While Respondent states that he does not desire a divorce, the parties had the benefit of
counseling before the filing of the Petition, have been separated for over two (2) years and have
established separate lives The court concludes that there are grounds for entering a decree of
divorce based on the existence of irreconcilable differences that prevent the marriage from
continuing
2.

CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT: There were six children born to this

marriage, of whom four are still minors Dana May Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyle Allen
Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin
Wallace Richardson, born March 25, 1993 The parties do not contest child custody and appear
to be in agreement with Petitioner should have sole physical and legal custody Petitioner was the
primary caretaker for the children prior to the parties' separation and the children continue to live
with her at their present home in West Valley City, Utah, while Kenneth has remained in Alaska,
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where the parties lived since their marriage in Anchorage on August 20, 1980 Petitioner appears
to strongly desire custody, and she has been and continues to be a fit parent There is no
indication that the children have any different custody preference The court concludes that
Petitioner is and has been a fit and proper parent, that there is not reason to disturb the parties'
own agreement with respect to custody
3.

For purposes of the child support calculation, gross income includes income from

almost any source, other than those specifically excluded by the statute See U C. A, Section 7845-7.7(1). At the time of trial Respondent was working M time for Aurora Electric in
Anchorage as a project manager/estimator, earning a salary of $1,188 47 per week according to a
January 28, 2005, Employer Earnings Statement showing about $61,800 00 per year Apparently
some time in 2003, after the parties' separation, Respondent was promoted to this supervisory
position from the journeyman electrician position that he had formerly held at Aurora Electric
He received a lower salary in the prior position, but normally and consistently worked substantial
overtime (more than 40 hours per week) during the marriage and thus earned about $5,000 00
(2001 W-2) to $6,000 00 (2002 W-2) more each year than he does now, because as a supervisor,
overtime is no longer available to him Respondent testified that he took the promotion because it
was a job change that he wanted and because his boss urged him to take the new position for the
benefit of the company While there is no indication other than timing that Respondent took the
promotion in order to deliberately reduce his income for purposes of this proceeding, this was in
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significant part a voluntary decision on his part that reduced his income For this reason, the
court believes that it is fair to consider his previous scrapping activities (in which he made up to
$1,000 per year from time to time) as a source of income still open to him and to consider his
historical overtime In all, the court believes that it is reasonable to impute $1,700 00 per year a
reasonable assessment of Kenneth's additional earning capacity for purposes of child support and
alimony calculations, giving him some latitude to make changes in his work position to
accommodate reasonable work-related goals, while recognizing that those changes are largely
voluntary, as well as taking into account his ability to make additional income, as he has in the
past, from scrapping or other work
4.

In addition, Respondent receives an annual distribution made to all citizens of the

State of Alaska The most recent such distribution was $919, and Respondent testified that it was
sometimes less and sometimes more The court finds that a reasonable estimate of Respondent's
income from state distributions is between $500 and $2,000, with the average bearing significantly
toward the higher figure, or about $1,500 This annual payment falls within the broad scope of
gross income under the statute, and the court concludes that the $1,500 00 figure is a reasonable
estimate of ongoing income from this source for purposes of calculating gross income (for child
support and alimony) Respondent's gross income for child support purposes is therefore
$61,800 00 plus $1,700 00 plus $1,500, a total of $65,000 per yeai, or $5,417 00 per month
5

Petitioner is employed by the State of Utah, working full time Her last pay stub
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for 2004 showed her annual salary to be $21,927 00 or $1,827 00 per month Petitioner's work
experience is relatively minimal because of the parties' decisions regarding how their family would
function during the marriage After about a year of employment, Petitioner cared for the children
at home during the marriage, with only short periods of part time employment, and she does not
appear to have developed any specialized job skills. There was no evidence that she had either the
opportunity or the capacity to earn more than what she is making now; and the court concludes
that she is fully employed in her present position at the present rate of pay, which is her gross
income.
6.

There is no evidence that either party was obligated to any other person for

alimony or child support outside the bounds of this case, and therefore gross income and adjusted
gross income are the same for each party. These figures are therefore to be used for calculating
the share of child support attributable to each party, with Respondent to be the obligated party.
7.

Based upon the foregoing, Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the

sum of $1,374 per month commencing as of the date of trial herein
8.

Respondent's obligation to pay child support shall continue as to each minor child

until that minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school, whichever
later occurs.
9.

Pursuant to Utah Code §62A-11-401 et seq and -501, withholding of child support

from Respondent's wages as a means of collecting child support shall be authorized.

5

10.

INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS: The parties propose that they should each be

allocated tax deductions for two children, but disagree on which No real basis for allocation was
presented other than the representation that Petitioner needed at least one child deduction as
follows. Dana and Justin to Petitioner and Kyle and Avery to Respondent. When Dana reaches
eighteen (18), the exemptions should alternate to equalize the benefits as much as possible, with
Respondent having the deductions for two children and Petitioner for one the first year in which
there are only three deductions available, Petitioner having two and Respondent one in the second
year, and so on. When the deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may claim one
deduction, when there is only one deduction left, that deduction goes to Petitioner. In the
alternative, for any tax year the party for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to
purchase the option(s) from the other party for the amount the other party would lost if the
exemption were not available.
11.

MEDICAL INSURANCE & EXPENSES: Each party shall provide medical

insurance for the minor children as long as it remains available at a reasonable cost through his or
her employment

If Respondent secures insurance, Respondent shall provide evidence of said

coverage and that such coverage is effective in Utah.
a.

Each parent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium

actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion of the
premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children
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shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the
policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case
b

Each parent shall pay one-half (Vi) of all reasonable and necessary

uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the dependent
children.
c.

The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of

coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent children,
and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he/she knew or should have known of the change
d.

The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification

of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within thirty (30) days of
payment
e.

In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, a parent

incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with above.
12.

PERSONAL PROPERTY: The evidence at trial indicated disagreement over the
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value and division of the certain personal property acquired during the marriage This involved
essentially a savings account containing about $1,000 00, a certificate of deposit in the amount of
approximately $6,000 00, a set of firearms collected by Respondent, tools, certain items of
apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor, and three vehicles a van in Petitioner's possession
and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003 Ford Ranger) in Respondent's possession
The parties agreed at the end of the trial that Petitioner receive the savings account, the certificate
of deposit and the van and that Respondent be awarded the two trucks, the tools, the firearm
collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items The court has no reason to believe that this
division is not fair and equitable and therefore concludes that it is
13

There is also a New York Life Insurance Policy on Respondent's life with a

$50,000 00 face amount and a cash value of about $6,300 00 Respondent proposed that the
policy be cashed out and the proceeds be share equally between the parties It was not clear to
the court what Petitioner wanted in this regard It appears to the court that it would be of some
value to the parties and in the children's interest to keep the insurance policy in place, with
Respondent to pay the premiums, having the minor children irrevocably designated as the
beneficiaries and Petitioner as Trustee for the minor children Once the last child is emancipated,
the policy is to cashed in, with Petitioner to receive within sixty (60) days thereafter one-half QA)
of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time of trial The parties have the option, if they
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both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now, with the amount received in payment to be
divided equally between them
14.

Further, Respondent has a 401 (k) that shall be divided equally and a Qualified

Domestic Relations Order shall be prepared, if necessary. Any loans taken out by Respondent
since the parties separation shall be added to the balance of the 401(k) prior to division.
Respondent shall provide a copy of his most recent statement showing the current balance and
loan balance of the 401(k).
15.

REAL PROPERTY: There are two (2) parcels of real property at issue, the

marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near Anchorage, and an unimproved, .92 acre lot located in
a subdivision in Willow, Alaska. Neither property is encumbered by a mortgage or other
significant lien. The parties agree that the equity of each property should be divided between
them, but they disagree about the value of each property Petitioner believed the Willow lot to be
worth about $10,000.00, based on unspecified calls to real estate agents in the area. Respondent
estimated the lot to be worth $3,000.00 to $4,000.00 and said that it had an assessment value on
the tax notice of $4,200 00. The court believes that an estimated value of $5,000.00 is reasonable
approximation of the value of the lot, given the sparse information presented Petitioner is to
receive $2,500.00 as her share of the Willow lot's value.
16.

The Eagle River home was purchased about twenty (20) years ago for about
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$50,000 00 It was appraised in early 2004 at $60,000 00 Respondent says the appraisal is
incorrect because it indicates that the house, a modular house, has sanitary sewer, asphalt street,
curb and gutter, which it does not have He believes it is worth $47,000 00 based on a tax
assessment and on his estimate that it will take about $13,000 00 to connect the house to
municipal sewer, a step he says is necessary to make the house saleable Petitioner says she
believes the appraisal is correct, even without a sewer hook-up, and that the house cannot have
depreciated in value since it was purchased The appraisal indicates that property values in the
area are increasing, and no evidence was presented on how property tax assessments were made.
Respondent has presented no reliable evidence of the effect on property value of the lack of sewer
hook-up, much less that the value would be directly related to the cost of providing such an
improvement Nor has he presented any evidence of how property tax assessments are made in
the area or how reliable an indication of actual value they are or that property values have
decreased since the purchase of the property for $50,000 00 over twenty (20) years ago The
court believes that the appraisal is the most reliable indication of value under the circumstances
and finds that the house is worth $60,000 00 at the time of trial and the equity should be divided
equally, with the house to be sold and the net proceeds split equally between the parties In the
alternative, if Respondent wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000 00 to Petitioner
17.

ALIMONY: "[T]he purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from
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becoming a public charge and to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage to
the extent possible " Howell v. Howell, 806 P 2d 1209 (Ut Ct App 1991), citing Fletcher v
Fletcher, 615 P 2nd 1218, 1223 (Utah 1980) The Supreme Court, in Jones v. Jones, 700 P 2d
1072 (Utah 1985), set out "three factors that must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony
award [1] the financial conditions and needs of the wife, [2] the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself, and [3] the ability of the husband to provide support " Id. At 1075
(edits by the court, citations omitted), U C A, Sect. 30-3-5(8) (which expands the number of
factors to be considered, while retaining the Jones factors as an essence of the inquiry) After the
determination of the needs and resources of both parties using the Jones factors, "the court should
set alimony as permitted by those parameters, to approximate the parties' standard of living
during the marriage as closely as possible " Howell, 806 P 2d at 1212 In the case of a long-term
marriage, the alimony award "should, cto the extent possible, equalize the parties' respective
standards of living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage '" Id, quoting Gardner v Gardner, 748 P 2d 1076, 1081 (Utah
1988) cf Howell, 806 P 2nd at 1216 n 4 ("The alimony award, however, need not be large
enough to maintain the receiving spouse at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage if
that amount of alimony would lower the standard of living of the paying spouse below that of the
receiving spouse ") Having considered "all relevant facts and equitable principles," the court
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"may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial."
U C.A., Section 30-3-5(8)(c)
18.

Petitioner's income, as discussed above, is $1,827.00 per month. Accepting the

annual deductions from her salary as set out in her 2004 year-end pay stub, they are Federal Tax
($465.10), Social Security Tax ($1,286.53), Medicare Tax ($300.88), State Tax $551.73), and
health, dental and vision insurance (together $1,176.52), for a total monthly deduction of about
$315.00. Her net income for alimony purposes is therefore $1,512.00. (The court is not
considering deductions for life insurance for either party because essentially voluntary (on the part
of Petitioner) or building cash value from this point forward (on the part of Respondent)). Child
support payments will be approximately $1,375.00 per month. Total net income, without
consideration of alimony tax consequences, is therefore about $2,897.00.
19.

As to general expense deductions, the court believes that Petitioner's monthly

expenses, as set forth in Exhibit 7, are reasonable, especially considering that she is caring for four
(4) children. Neither party presented much evidence of their standard of living at the time of
separation, so the court is relying primarily on evidence regarding their expenses as a fair
substitute or approximation. While she filed a financial declaration earlier that stated lower
expenses, the court found credible her explanation that she had been keeping expenses
deliberately low during that period because of the financial uncertainties of the unresolved divorce
and had increased her expenses to a more normal level during 2004, the subject period for Exhibit
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7 Those deductions are supported by detailed monthly expense reports Nevertheless, Exhibit 7
contains more expenses that the court considers as either one-time costs or not allowable for
purposes of alimony determination Those include attorneys fees and mediation costs related to
the divorce in the amount of $1,331 00 They also include $1,779 00 in what appears to be a onetime cost for the purchase of appliances ($906 10 to Maytag on January 26 and $873 05 to
Maytag on February 7), although the court believes that one-half that amount (about ($890 00) is
a reasonable annual budget for general maintenance of a home and its contents over a the long
term, given the number of children in her care and the need to furnish a separate house, and ought
to be included as an expense Because the testimony indicated that the parties historically have
made donations to their church at about ten percent (10%) of income and continue to do so, each
listing such donations as part of their expenses, the court considers these donations as a
continuing part of their previous and present standard of living and will include them as
reasonable expenses for both parties Deducting $185 00 per month for one-time expenses,
Petitioner's reasonable expenses are $3,306 00 per month The deficit between her income,
including initial child support, and her reasonable expenses is therefore about $409 00 per month
20.

Respondent's income, as discussed above, is $5,417 00 per month This amounts

to salary of $61,800 00 per year, plus $1,500 00 state payment and $1,700 00 additional
attributed income, per the analysis set forth above Deductions, per Respondent's weekly Direct
Deposit Earnings Statement, including Medicaid $16 94), Social Security ($72 45), Federal Tax
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$117.85), local tax $5.40) and health insurance $10.25). The court is not considering deductions
for 401k contributions, a medical flex plan and a 401k loan repayment The loan payment
deduction (amounting to about $193.00 per month) is to pay off a $10,000 00 loan Respondent
took out of his retirement plan in 2003, after the separation, to pay attorneys fees $5,000.00, a
down payment on a new truck ($3,000.00), and a deposit in a savings account $2,000.00). The
court does not believe the repayment on this loan, given its timing and the use of the proceeds,
ought to be counted as a deduction from salary for alimony purposes. Other deductions appear
reasonable. Similarly, the medical flex plan is a voluntary contribution (about $10.00 per week)
that can be used to pay medical expenses as they arise (apparently deductibles and other expenses
not covered by insurance). Because this is essentially a medical savings plan for the benefit of the
Respondent, it should not be counted as a true deduction for alimony purposes.
21.

The total weekly deductions from salary are therefore about $223.00 or about

$966.00 per month. Including an additional $26 00 per month to account for a proportional
amount of deductions for the imputed $1,700.00 per year (there was no evidence that the state
payment of $1,982.00 per year was taxed), the total deductions are about $992.00 per month,
leaving a net income, before any alimony tax benefits of $4,465.00 There was no evidence of the
effect of alimony payments on Respondent's tax liability or alimony receipt on Petitioner's, but
the court does not believe that tax considerations related to alimony would substantially alter the
conclusions reached herein.
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22.

Some expenses the court believes should not be included. As discussed above, the

court does not believe that the expenses for repayment of the 401k loan (about $193.00 per
month) and life insurance (which the court estimates at $65.00 per moth based on the absence of
any other evidence other than Respondent's claim to have $165.00 in monthly expenses for all
insurance other than deducted health insurance premiums) should be included for purposes of
alimony determination, as they are not necessities, and neither party urged their inclusion. In
addition, Respondent claims a total of $350.00 per month in medical and dental expenses. There
was no evidence of a need for health care that would support expenses at that level, especially
since he apparently has employer-provided health insurance for which amounts are deducted from
his salary; and absent any evidence of particular health conditions requiring treatment, the court
believes that $50.00 per month is reasonable. Respondent's reasonable expenses are therefore
about $3,628.00.
23.

Respondent therefore has a surplus of net income over expenses of about $837.00

per month The court notes that, while both the parties and the court have used figures for
income and expenses that appear quite specific, these figures in reality are approximations,
especially as they are meant to ultimately represent amounts received and spent in the future. In
determining alimony, the court recognizes and takes into account the imprecision of the amounts
involved.
24.

Other than the equity in the marital home, the parties have accumulated little in the

15

way of resources to supplement their incomes Considering Petitioner's financial condition and
needs and her inability to provide sufficient income to meet those needs, together with
Respondent's ability to provide support and the significant income differential between them even
taking into account the payment and receipt of child support, the court concludes that Respondent
shall pay alimony to Petitioner In addition, the court believes it is significant that this is a long
term marriage in which Petitioner gave up her ability to improve her skills and earning capacity to
care for a large family, so that should play a part in the determination of alimony amounts, as well
See Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213. The court believes that alimony in the amount of $420.00 is a fair
and reasonable award This sum approximates the Petitioner's need, before consideration of the
alimony tax consequences, and falls within Respondent's capacity to pay, as determined by the
court.
25

While a significant amount of her expenses can now be attributed to minor children

in the home, a good part of the income needed by Petitioner to maintain the appropriate standard
of living is also attributable to child support payments from Respondent As children reach the
age of eighteen (18), which will be a regular occurrence over the next few years, the court
believes that Petitioner's income will be reduced disproportionately to the reduction of expenses
both because the reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children will not
necessarily diminish to zero as they reach eighteen (18) years old and because expenses, such as
mortgage, utilities and so on will not necessarily be significantly or proportionately reduce even
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when children do leave the home For that reason, the court concludes that it is reasonable to
increase alimony to some extent as Petitioner's income from child support payments goes down
and as Respondent's expenses from such payments also diminish This also contributes to the
goal of maintaining a rough equivalence in the parties' standard of living after a long-term
marriage Id. (considering the effects of diminishing child support obligations as children reach
eighteen (18) on the relative disparity of income between spouses) The alimony payments due to
Petitioner should therefore increase by $100 00 per month, beginning the first day of the month
after which each child turns eighteen (18) On this basis, when the last child turns eighteen (18),
Respondent's income will have increase by about $1,375 00 per month, while commensurate
alimony increases to Petitioner will amount to $400 00 per month, leaving him with some cushion
that takes into account the purported increased costs of living in Alaska and not reducing his
standard of living below Petitioner's
26.

Alimony should continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage Changes

in income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be
considered as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate Alimony should be
paid retroactive to and including May, 2004
27.

PARENT-TIME: While it is apparent that Respondent loves his children, during

the marriage he took a decidedly harsher approach to their discipline than did Petitioner, going to
the extreme of punishing them by the use of a belt on occasion and threatening to do so more
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regularly The court believes that this goes beyond acceptable limits on discipline of children and
it apparently played a part in the break up of the marriage The children remain somewhat
intimidated by their father, and their distance from him, both emotional and geographical at this
point, has been exacerbated by his decision that it would be best under the circumstances of the
separation to contact them infrequently While his telephone contacts have recently increased, he
has seen the children only a few times since the separation. Some or all of the children have been
in counseling to deal in part with issues involving their father.
28.

It is in the best interest of the children to reestablish their relationship with their

father as soon as possible and that his access to them be as liberal as the distances involved allow,
at a minimum in accordance with the applicable guidelines for parent time Under the
circumstances, Respondent shall successfully complete a parenting class that is functionally
equivalent to the multi-week parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on court referral
Further, such course shall administered by an agency approved by the State of Alaska, such as the
Men & Women's Center or the Recovery Connection Once Respondent has done this, parenttime should begin pursuant to §30-3-37 of the Utah Code The court's primary concern is that
Respondent complete the parenting course before the children are required to go to Alaska for
parent-time If Respondent travels to Utah in the interim, even without first having completed the
class, and upon reasonable notice, he should be allowed minimum parent-time pursuant to §30-335 of the Utah Code or as the parties may agree Respondent should also be given liberal

18

telephone access to the children at a minimum three (3) times per week, plus e-mail
communication if available The parties should contact Valley Mental Health (Kathy Reimherr556-6037) to determine the nature of its parenting class, and Respondent can complete that
program or one in Alaska that is roughly equivalent (for example, a multi-week parenting class
approved by the Alaska counterpart to Division of Child and Family Services). No later than
thirty (30) days from December 23, 2005, Respondent's counsel shall provide Petitioner's counsel
with a description of the class he intends to take. If the parties are in agreement that the proposed
class meets the requirements of the court, Respondent should complete the class as soon as
reasonably possible. If the parties are in disagreement, they should approach the court for a
resolution, but prepare to offer specific alternatives. As soon as Respondent has provided written
verification that he has successfully completed the appropriate parenting class, his parent-time as
set forth above can begin, including travel to Alaska. All applicable provisions of the advisory
guidelines set forth in §303-33 of the Utah Code shall be adopted herein
29.

Petitioner is ordered to pay the transportation costs of one (1) visit per year,

provided that (a) there is not only one (1) visit, and (b) arrangements are made at least thirty (30)
days in advance If there is only one (1) visit per year, Petitioner shall be responsible for only onehalf QA) of the transportation costs for that visit.
30.

ATTORNEYS FEES: Based on the Court's assessment that Petitioner's
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expenses are beyond her income and other resources at this point and on its conclusions that
Respondent's resources provide him with a surplus over his expenses (as discussed in connection
with alimony, above), the court concludes that Respondent should be responsible to pay
Petitioner's reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter. Petitioner has insufficient income
to meet her needs, and alimony payments will bring her income up to the point where her needs
are met, not including attorney's fees. Respondent will have a level of surplus and is more able to
pay fees. Petitioner should provide evidence of the amount and reasonableness of the fees she
claims to the Court.
31.

NAME CHANGE:

Petitioner shall be restored to her maiden name if desired.

From the foregoing findings of facts, the Court now makes and enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the bonds of matrimony hereto and now existing between Petitioner and

Respondent shall be dissolved and Petitioner shall be granted decree of divorce from Respondent,
the same to become absolute and final upon the signing of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and the Decree of Divorce and thefilingof the same with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court.
2.

That all matters and issues including, but not limited to, child custody, parent-time,

child support, alimony, division of property and debts, and attorney fees shall be ordered pursuant
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"to*

to the foregoing Findings of Fact
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RICHARDSON,KENNETH ANDREW

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON,

]

Petitioner,

]

vs.
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON,
Respondent

])

Case No 034905249 DA

]
)
])

Judge Stephen L Roth
Commissioner Susan Bradford

DECREE OF DIVORCE

The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Stephen L Roth of the aboveentitled Court on the 8th day of February, 2005 Petitioner appeared in person and was
represented by her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka Respondent appeared in person and was
represented by his counsel, J Bruce Reading The Court, having heard argument of counsel and
testimony of the parties and witnesses, having reviewed the file in this matter, having taken the

matter under advisement, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE AS FOLLOWS:
1

Petitioner is awarded a divorce from Respondent based on the existence of

irreconcilable differences that prevent the marriage from continuing.
2

CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT: There were six children born to this

marriage, of whom four are still minors- Dana May Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyle Allen
Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin
Wallace Richardson, born March 25, 1993 Petitioner is awarded sole physical and legal custody
of the minor children
3

Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the sum of $1,374 per month

commencing as of the date of trial herein
4

Respondent's obligation to pay child support shall continue as to each minor child

until that minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school, whichever
later occurs
5

Pursuant to Utah Code §62A-11-401 et seq and -501, withholding of child support

from Respondent's wages as a means of collecting child support shall be authorized
6

INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS: Petitioner shall be awarded the minor children

2

Dana and Justin as dependants for tax exemption purposes and Respondent shall be awarded the
minor children Kyle and Avery When Dana reaches eighteen (18), the exemptions should
alternate to equalize the benefits as much as possible, with Respondent having the deductions for
two children and Petitioner for one the first year in which there are only three deductions
available, Petitioner having two and Respondent one in the second year, and so on When the
deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may claim one deduction, when there is only
one deduction left, that deduction goes to Petitioner In the alternative, for any tax year the party
for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to purchase the option(s) from the other
party for the amount the other party would lost if the exemption were not available The parties
shall exchange tax information by March 1st of each year In any event, Respondent's ability to
claim any minor child(ren) is conditioned upon his being current in his child support and medical
expense obligations
7.

MEDICAL INSURANCE & EXPENSES: Each party shall provide medical

insurance for the minor children as long as it remains available at a reasonable cost through his or
her employment If Respondent secures insurance, Respondent shall provide evidence of said
coverage and that such coverage is effective in Utah
a.

Each parent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium

actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance The children's portion of the
premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid The premium expense for the children

3

shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the
policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case.
b.

Each parent shall pay one-half QA) of all reasonable and necessary

uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the dependent
children.
c.

The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of

coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent children,
and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he/she knew or should have known of the change.
d.

The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification

of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within thirty (30) days of
payment.
e.

In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, a parent

incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with above.
8.

PERSONAL PROPERTY: During the marriage the parties acquired certain

4

items of personal property including a savings account containing about $1,000 00, a certificate of
deposit in the amount of approximately $6,000 00, a set of firearms collected by Respondent,
tools, certain items of apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor, and three vehicles* a van in
Petitioner's possession and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003 Ford Ranger) in
Respondent's possession. Petitioner shall be awarded the savings account, the certificate of
deposit and the van and Respondent shall be awarded the two trucks, the tools, the firearm
collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items.
9.

There is also a New York Life Insurance Policy on Respondent's life with a

$50,000.00 face amount and a cash value of about $6,300.00. It is in minor children's interest to
keep the insurance policy in place, with Respondent to pay the premiums, having the minor
children irrevocably designated as the beneficiaries and Petitioner as Trustee for the minor
children. Once the last child is emancipated, the policy is to cashed in, with Petitioner to receive
within sixty (60) days thereafter one-half (V2) of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time
of trial. The parties have the option, if they both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now,
with the amount received in payment to be divided equally between them
10.

Further, Respondent has a 401(k) that shall be divided equally and a Qualified

Domestic Relations Order shall be prepared, if necessary. Any loans taken out by Respondent
since the parties separation shall be added to the balance of the 401(k) prior to division.

5

Respondent shall provide a copy of his most recent statement showing the current balance and
loan balance of the 401 (k).
11

REAL PROPERTY: During the marriage the parties acquired two (2) parcels of

real property the marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near Anchorage, and an unimproved, .92
acre lot located in a subdivision in Willow, Alaska. Neither property is encumbered by a
mortgage or other significant lien. Respondent shall be awarded the Willow lot, but shall pay to
Petitioner the sum of $2,500.00 as her share of the Willow lot's value.
12.

The Eagle River residence shall be sold and the proceeds shall be split equally

between the parties. However, if Respondent wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000.00
to Petitioner.
13.

ALIMONY: Petitioner is awarded the sum of $420.00 per month in alimony

from Respondent. The alimony payment due to Petitioner shall increase by $100.00 per month,
beginning the first day of the month after which each child turns eighteen (18). On this basis,
when the last child turns eighteen (18), the alimony increases to Petitioner will amount to an
additional $400.00 per month.
14.

Alimony shall continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage. Changes

in income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be
considered as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate Alimony shall also

6

be paid retroactive to and including May, 2004 Said alimony obligation shall be automatically
withheld by the Office of Recovery Services
15

PARENT-TIME: Respondent shall successfully complete a parenting class that is

functionally equivalent to the multi-week parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on
court referral Further, such course shall administered by an agency approved by the State of
Alaska, such as the Men & Women's Center or the Recovery Connection Once Respondent has
done this, parent-time shall begin pursuant to §30-3-37 of the Utah Code Respondent must
complete the parenting course before the children are required to go to Alaska for parent-time If
Respondent travels to Utah in the interim, even without first having completed the class, and upon
reasonable notice, he shall be allowed minimum parent-time pursuant to §30-3-35 of the Utah
Code, or as the parties may agree Respondent shall also be given liberal telephone access to the
children at a minimum three (3) times per week, plus e-mail communication if available The
parties shall contact Valley Mental Health (Kathy Reimherr-556-6037) to determine the nature of
its parenting class, and Respondent can complete that program or one in Alaska that is roughly
equivalent (for example, a multi-week parenting class approved by the Alaska counterpart to
Division of Child and Family Services) No later than thirty (30) days from December 23, 2005,
Respondent's counsel shall provide Petitioner's counsel with a description of the class he intends
to take If the parties are in agreement that the proposed class meets the requirements of the
court, Respondent shall complete the class as soon as reasonably possible If the parties are in

7

disagreement, they shall approach the court for a resolution, but prepare to offer specific
alternatives. As soon as Respondent has provided written verification that he has successfully
completed the appropriate parenting class, his parent-time as set forth above can begin, including
travel to Alaska. All applicable provisions of the advisory guidelines set forth in §303-33 of the
Utah Code shall be adopted herein.
16.

Petitioner is ordered to pay the transportation costs of one (1) visit per year,

provided that (a) there is not only one (1) visit, and (b) arrangements are made at least thirty (30)
days in advance. If there is only one (1) visit per year, Petitioner shall be responsible for only onehalf QA) of the transportation costs for that visit.
17.

ATTORNEY'S FEES: Respondent shall be responsible to pay Petitioner's

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter in the sum of $4,488.00.
18.

NAME CHANGE: Petitioner shall be restored to her maiden name if desired.

DATED this /feSlay of

/t/t^f

^
*

. 2006.

HONORABLE STEPHEN L. ROTH? /
THIRD DISTRICT
COVKTf^^$y
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Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and McHugh.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Respondent Kenneth Andrew Richardson appeals the trial
court's alimony award, arguing that the trial court erred when it
ordered him to pay incremental increases in alimony to his exwife, Petitioner Kynda Kay Richardson, upon the termination of
child support. Mr. Richardson further asserts that the trial
court erred when it awarded Ms. Richardson retroactive alimony,
even though- she failed to include a request for interim alimony
in her petition for divorce. "We review a trial court's award of
alimony for abuse of discretion. 'We will not disturb the trial
court's alimony award so long as the trial court exercises its
discretion within the standards set by the appellate courts.'"
Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357,17, 80 P.3d 153
(citation omitted) (quoting Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 423
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)). We affirm.
First, Mr. Richardson contends that the trial court erred by
ordering that, as each of the parties' children turns eighteen
years old and the amount of child support decreases, the amount
of alimony Mr. Richardson pays Ms. Richardson increases.
Specifically, Mr. Richardson argues that it was improper for the
trial court to mandate future changes to Ms. Richardson's alimony
award based on a speculative change in her circumstances. We

believe, however, that Mr. Richardson mischaracterizes the
considerations upon which the trial court based the increases in
alimony.
Under Utah law, "[t]he trial court has broad latitude" in
determining alimony awards. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074
(Utah 1985). In making such awards, "the court shall consider
all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its
discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed
at the time of trial." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (c) (Supp.
2006). Moreover, "[t]he court may, under appropriate
circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties1 respective
standards of living." Id. § 30-3-5 (8) (d) . As the supreme court
stated, "the purpose of alimony . . . 'is to provide support for
the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living she
enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a
public charge.1" Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075 (quoting English v.
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)).
Based on the underlying purpose of alimony, the supreme
court "articulated three factors that must be considered in
fixing a reasonable alimony award: '[1] the financial conditions
and needs of the wife; [2] the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and [3] the ability of the husband
to provide support.'" Id. (quoting English, 565 P.2d at 411-12).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that upon Mr.
Richardson's motion to reconsider, the trial court properly
"analyzed the circumstances of the parties in light of these
three factors." Id.
It is clear that the trial court considered Ms. Richardson's
financial needs as well as her ability to support herself. The
trial court noted that
[t]he parties were married for over twenty
years and had six children. [Ms. Richardson]
gave up her ability to acquire significant
work skills and earning capacity to care for
a large family, and continued to care for the
remaining four minor children at the time of
trial. She is in her forties or fifties and
is not likely to significantly increase her
earning capacity to a point where she can
support herself at a standard the parties
enjoyed during the marriage.
This court has discussed the appropriateness of such alimony
considerations "after a long-term marriage, where the wife
(usually) has worked primarily in the home, has limited job
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skills, and is in her late forties or fifties." Howell v.
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
The trial court determined that Ms. Richardson's initial
alimony award of $42 0 per month was appropriate to address her
needs, but only because that amount was "based on [Ms.
Richardson's] present sources of income, including about $1375 in
child support, which will decrease incrementally as each of the
four minor children turns eighteen." Thus, as child support
payments decrease, so does that source of Ms. Richardson's
income. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court order
incrementally increasing Ms. Richardson's alimony award properly
considered her financial needs as well as her ability to support
herself.
The trial court also properly considered Mr. Richardson's
"ability . . . to provide support." Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075.
The trial court determined that while Mr. Richardson pays his
child support obligations, the parties1 respective incomes are
equalized. However, as his child support obligations terminate
over time, his ability to pay support to Ms. Richardson increases
while her ability to meet her own needs decreases. Without the
addition of incremental increases in alimony payments to Ms.
Richardson upon termination of child support, the parties' gross
monthly incomes would be significantly disproportionate, and she
would not be able to enjoy the standard of living she enjoyed
during the marriage.
After considering Mr. Richardson's ability to pay alimony
once his child support obligations decrease, the trial court
determined that upon the termination of his child support
payments, Mr. Richardson has an increased ability to provide Ms.
Richardson the support she needs to maintain the standard of
living she enjoyed during the marriage. These incremental
increases in alimony meet the goal of "better equaliz[ing] the
parties' abilities to go forward with their respective lives"
after their long-term marriage, Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213, and
provide Ms. Richardson with "the [approximate] standard of living
she enjoyed during marriage," Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075
(Utah 1985) . Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding Ms. Richardson incremental
increases in alimony as her child support payments terminate.
Second, Mr. Richardson argues that the trial court erred
when it awarded Ms. Richardson retroactive alimony, even though
she never petitioned the court for interim alimony during the
divorce proceedings. Utah Code section 3 0-3-3 provides that the
trial court "may order a party to provide money, during the
pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance
of the other party." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(3) (Supp. 2006).
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Section 30-3-3 further indicates that interim alimony may be
ordered "prior to the entry of the final order or judgment [and]
may be amended during the course of the action or in the final
order or judgment." Id. § 30-3-3(4). This section allows a
trial court to award interim alimony and does not specifically
state that a party must request that the trial court order
interim alimony prior to entry of the final order. See id. § 3 03-3.
Here, Ms. Richardson did not separately request interim
alimony in her petition for divorce, but instead simply requested
alimony. However, she testified at trial that she was seeking
interim alimony. Section 30-3-5(1) gives the trial court power
to include "equitable orders" in divorce decrees, id. § 30-33(5), and the trial court has broad discretion in using this
power. See Curry v. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 P.2d 939, 942
(Utah 1958) (recognizing that "the trial court is vested with
broad equitable powers in divorce matters and that its judgment
will not be disturbed lightly, nor at all unless the evidence
clearly preponderates against [its] findings, or there has been a
plain abuse of discretion, or a manifest injustice or inequity is
wrought"). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly
exercised its broad equitable powers in awarding retroactive
alimony to Ms. Richardson.
Accordingly, we affirm.

WE CONCUR:

£ ^ y x£^*M^
.a T. Greenwood,
Associate Presiding Judge
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Carolyn B, McHugh, Ju
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Kynda Kay Richardson,
Respondent,
v.

Case No. 20070578-SC
20060575-CA

Kenneth Andrew Richardson,
Petitioner.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on July 20, 2007.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari
is granted as to the following issue:
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district
court's award of an additional amount for alimony as each
child of the Petitioner and Respondent reaches majority and
Petitioner's obligation to pay support for each child
terminates.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.

FOR THE COURT:

Date

T

&M7-

Christine M. Durham,
Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 24, 2007, a -true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail or placed in the Interdepartmental mail service, or hand
delivered to the parties listed below:
J BRUCE READING
SCALLEY READING BATES HANSEN & RASMUSSEN
15 W S TEMPLE STE 600
PO BOX 1142 9
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84147
SCOTT L WIGGINS
ARNOLD .& WIGGINS PC
AMERICAN PLAZA II STE 105
57 W 200 S
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
LISA COLLINS
COURT OF APPEALS
4 50 S STATE ST,
PO BOX 140230
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: JODI BAILEY / MARINA DAVIS
4 50 S STATE ST
PO BOX 18 60
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
Dated this October 24, 2007.
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